Russia’s game in Belarus: 2020 presidential elections as a checkmate for Lukashenka?

Leukavets, Alla

doi:10.1177/2336825x20984337

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…As we already pointed out, the 2020 protests were ‘largely bereft of the geopolitical component’ (Leukavets, 2021), and opposition leaders like Tsikhanouskaya made repeated public gestures towards the Kremlin, signalling that a democratic revolution would not necessarily mean a revision of the existing framework of Russia-Belarus relations. On the other hand, the Kremlin’s interpretation of the events initially had a strong geopolitical component and falling back on the previous pattern of conflictual relations with the West was one of the mechanisms through which Russia managed its new anxiety .…”

Section: ‘Minskva’: a Restructured Liminality?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The goals of the Union State were very ambitious, and would, in practice, mean integrating Belarus not with but into Russia, but Lukashenka never delivered on his integration promises. Following that, we turn to the 2020 protests as a ‘critical juncture’ (Leukavets, 2021) in Russia-Belarus relations and analyze how they affected the liminality of Belarus and the Russian practices of ontological security seeking.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Belarus as a liminal space for Russia’s ontological security before and after the 2020 protests

Kazharski

Kubová

2021

New Perspectives

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The article uses the ontological security framework and the concept of liminality to analyze Belarus liminal status vis-a-vis Russia and the role it has played in Russia’s ontological security seeking before and after the 2020 Belarus Awakening. It argues that while the entire near-abroad, and, in particular, Ukraine have been important in terms of Russia’s post-imperial ontological security seeking strategies, Belarus occupies a unique position with respect to Russia’s securitized identity because of its perfectly marginal or liminal status. This has to do with the fact that, in the Russian geopolitical gaze, Belarus has remained almost unseparated from the Russian Self. Furthermore, the 2020 protests challenged this status but did not entirely eliminate it, leading to a restructuration of Belarus’ liminality.

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Section: ‘Minskva’: a Restructured Liminality?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Belarus as a liminal space for Russia’s ontological security before and after the 2020 protests

Kazharski

Kubová

2021

New Perspectives

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“…In late August 2020, independent Belarusian newspapers were able to turn to Russian publishers after Belarusian printers refused to publish their papers ( Hrodno 015.by 2020). Many observers felt that Lukashenka’s survival was “contingent on Russia’s support” (Leukavets 2021, 90).…”

Section: The Puzzle Of Opposition Failure In Belarusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why the 2020 Belarusian Protests Failed to Oust Lukashenka

Way,

Tolvin

2023

Nationalities Papers

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This article uses a comparison with Ukraine to investigate why protests against Lukashenka in 2020 failed to oust the Belarusian dictator. First, in contrast to his counterparts in Ukraine, Lukashenka successfully built new authoritarian economic and coercive institutions in the 1990s that raised the costs of opposition activity and reduced challengers’ access to business support. Second, Belarus has lacked a strong national identity that was critical to opposition success in Ukraine. In Ukraine, relatively powerful anti-Russian nationalism repeatedly motivated a core group of anti-incumbent activists and facilitated the opposition’s control over local power structures that supported protest activities at critical moments. In Belarus, weak national identity and consequent dearth of committed activists in national government institutions in the 1990s hampered efforts to challenge Lukashenka’s consolidation of authoritarian power. In addition, weaker national identity undermined the capacity of opposition forces to control local power structures that might have aided opposition protest.

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“…Thus, Lukashenka was able to continue to refine his long-standing pattern of oscillating between East and West. On the one hand, Belarus was part of a Union State with Russia and had developed a high economic dependence on it, with Russia being the country's main trading partner and a provider of generous energy subsidies as well as preferential loans (Leukavets 2021). On the other hand, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 was perceived by Lukashenka as growing security threat.…”

Section: Low Regime Vulnerabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For Putin's own patronal regime, it is important that the person who replaces Lukashenka be not only loyal to the regional hegemon, but also a regime insider, since any possible transfer of power would need to happen swiftly and smoothly with a minimum of network reshuffling and the related political instability. When Lukashenka shifted toward Putin for support and financial aid in mid-August 2020 (Leukavets 2021), he not only contrived his own political survival. He also tilted the balance between state security-which he had prioritized after 2014-and the security of his regime clearly in favor of the latter (Ambrosio 2022).…”

Section: Electoral Fraud As a Focal Point For Solving The Problem Of ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Sense of a Surprise: Perspectives on the 2020 “Belarusian Revolution”

Stykow¹

2022

Nationalities Papers

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Drawing on three theoretical perspectives—“protest-democracy,” “authoritarian/patronal regime dynamics,” and “contentious politics”—developed in the study of popular protests in post-Soviet electoral autocracies, this article argues, first, that the 2020 postelection mobilization in Belarus was not to be expected for both structural and agency-related reasons. Second, by the summer of 2020, the political opportunity structure had opened up because of contingent choices by individual actors, with Alyaksandr Lukashenka committing several major mistakes, particularly on pandemic (non)control and the administration of the upcoming presidential election, and political newcomers taking on the role of challenging him. After the election, mass mobilization unfolded in two waves triggered by two additional regime mistakes: blatant electoral fraud and excessive repression. These mistakes served as focal points for spontaneous coordination, substituting for the deliberate “engineering” of protest by an organized opposition typical of the post-Soviet color revolutions. Third, Lukashenka survived in office because popular protests did not lead to elite defection. Instead, he was able to secure the loyalty of elites because he avoided gross blunders against both regime insiders and Russia. The case of Belarus indicates that hegemonic-authoritarian regimes are more vulnerable to mistakes by incumbents than to challenges from below and outside the regime.

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Russia’s game in Belarus: 2020 presidential elections as a checkmate for Lukashenka?

Cited by 8 publications

References 5 publications

Belarus as a liminal space for Russia’s ontological security before and after the 2020 protests

Belarus as a liminal space for Russia’s ontological security before and after the 2020 protests

Why the 2020 Belarusian Protests Failed to Oust Lukashenka

Making Sense of a Surprise: Perspectives on the 2020 “Belarusian Revolution”

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