Russian and European gas interdependence: Could contractual trade channel geopolitics?

Finon, Dominique; Locatelli, Catherine

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.08.038

Cited by 103 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The proposed model therefore helps to provide new 3 empirical insights into the security of supply for the European natural gas market. In this context, the relationship between Russia as a natural gas exporter and the European Union as an importer has attracted a substantial amount of research, such as the studies by Finon and Locatelli (2008), Goldthau (2008), Sagen and Tsygankova (2008) and Spanjer (2007). Morbee and Proost (2010) provide a theoretical framework for the relationship between European importers and Russia.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What drives natural gas prices? — A structural VAR approach

2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn this study, we develop a structural vector autoregressive model (VAR) for the German natural gas market.Our setup allows us to analyze the determinants of the natural gas price in a comprehensive framework. In particular, we illustrate the usefulness of our approach by disentangling the effects of different fundamental influences on gas prices during three recent supply interruptions: The Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009, the Libyan civil war in 2011 and the withheld Russian exports in February 2012. Our results show that the natural gas price is affected by temperature, storage and supply shortfalls in the short term, while the long-term development is closely tied to both crude oil and coal prices, capturing the economic climate and the energy specific demand.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What drives natural gas prices? — A structural VAR approach

2014

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“…What's more, in May 2007, Gazprom succeeded in recreating a strong alliance with the gas producers of Central Asia and bounded them to sell major shares of their gas to Gazprom and to install a large pipeline of 80 bcm/year to Russia along the Caspian Sea [6].…”

Section: Main Drawbacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bypassing Russia: Nabucco project and its implications for the European gas security

Erdoğdu

2010

Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews

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Restrictions on CO 2 emissions, the nuclear phase out announced by some member states, high emissions from coal-fired power plants, and barriers to rapid development of renewable generation are factors that make the European Union (EU) highly dependent on natural gas. With three non-EU countries (Russia, Algeria and Norway) currently supplying more than half the gas consumed within the EU and with projections pointing out that by 2030 internal sources will only be able to meet 25% of demand, EU desperately looks for means to secure new sources of gas supply. In this context, the Nabucco pipeline is planned to deliver gas from Caspian and Middle East regions to EU market. It runs across Turkey and then through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary before connecting with a major gas hub in Austria.On paper, Nabucco project makes perfect sense, offering a new export route to EU markets for Caspian gas producers (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) as well as Iran and, in time, Iraq. The project is backed by the EU and strongly supported by the United States. Perhaps most importantly, Nabucco would completely bypass Russia. This paper addresses issues surrounding Nabucco project and their implications for European gas security.

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“…Also, the interests of the GEFC-members, ranging from Iran to Norway (as observer) might be too diverse to pursue joint action (Hallouche, 2006). Finon and Locatelli (2008) analyze several possible forms of collusion, focusing on Russia. They conclude that in the short-term the chance of a successful cartel with just a few members is low since the barriers to entry are rather low for Gazprom's main competitors in the European market.…”

Section: From Gecf To Gaspec?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Major investments in infrastructure will be necessary in the coming decades to transport additional volumes of natural gas over increasingly longer distances, needing several trillions of dollars (See e.g., Cayrade, 2004, Finon and Locatelli, 2008, and IEA, 2003. However, so far research has not explicitly considered the impact that different market structures could have on the types of infrastructure, capacity expansions and the capital needs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representing GASPEC with the World Gas Model

et al. 2008

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper presents results of simulating a more collusive behavior of a group of natural gas producing and exporting countries, sometimes called GASPEC. We use the World Gas Model, a dynamic, strategic representation of world gas production, trade, and consumption between 2005 and 2030. In particular, we simulate a closer cooperation of the GASPEC countries when exporting pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas; we also run a more drastic scenario where GASPEC countries deliberately withhold production. The results shows that compared to a Base Case, a gas cartel would reduce total supplied quantities and induce price increases in gas importing countries up to 22%. There is evidence that the natural gas markets in Europe and North America would be affected more than other parts of the world. Lastly, the vulnerability of gas importers worldwide on gas exporting countries supplies is further illustrated by the results of a sensitivity case in which price levels are up to 87% higher in Europe and North America, but non-GEC countries increase production by a mere 10%.

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Russian and European gas interdependence: Could contractual trade channel geopolitics?

Cited by 103 publications

References 13 publications

What drives natural gas prices? — A structural VAR approach

What drives natural gas prices? — A structural VAR approach

Bypassing Russia: Nabucco project and its implications for the European gas security

Representing GASPEC with the World Gas Model

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