Russian Modernization: Between the Need for New Players and the Fear of Losing Control of Rent Sources

Abstract

This paper considers current contradictions in state-business relations in Russia. On one hand, the Russian political elite needs economic growth to keep social stability in the country and to limit mass protesting in big cities. Economic growth is impossible without investment, which explains Russian leaders' increased interest in improving Russia's business climate. On the other hand, influential interest groups (represented first of all by security and law enforcement agencies) try to expand their control on rent sources in the economy. These groups of interests could strengthen their positions due to fear of political protests. This strong conflict among different groups in the Russian elite creates additional uncertainty for investors and the business community, and can lead to economic recession independent of the level of oil prices and dynamics of global markets. Reversing these negative trends in economic development will be possible only with collective actions of different economic and political actors (including technocrats in federal and regional governments, representatives of large and successful middle-sized business and topmanagers of public sector organizations) in the search for pragmatic solutions to the challenges faced by Russian economy and society.

How mega-events capture their hosts: event seizure and the World Cup 2018 in Russia

“…In the absence of free elections, strong political institutions and independence of business activities from political interference, elites trade their power in exchange for resources (Yakovlev, 2006). This neopatrimonial system, in which the distribution of resources in exchange for the loyalty of the elites is common (Yakovlev, 2014), exacerbates event seizure. It turns events primarily into sources for rent extraction rather than projects to benefit the local population, to support long-term urban development or to create economic growth (Kinossian & Morgan, 2014).…”

The Evolution of the Collective Forms of Interaction between Foreign Business and Government in Russia

“…-к Совету безопасности. На фоне резкого ухудшения отношений с Западом после событий на Украине в российских элитах начал формироваться внутренний идеологический раскол относительно приоритетов дальнейшего развития страны, особенно проявившийся в разногласиях между экономическим и силовым блоками в правительстве (Yakovlev, 2014). Сохраняющаяся ориентация экономического блока на глобальную интеграцию вошла в противоречие с тенденцией к самоизоляции, идущей от силового блока, в результате чего правительство оказалось неспособно выработать единую повестку экономического развития.…”

“Stability’s” End: The Political Economy of Russia’s Intersecting Crises since 2009

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