Russian Transimperialism and Its Implications

Do the CIS member states share foreign policy preferences?

“…Let us now consider some of the more noticeable trends. (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005) were expected by many to weaken not only the CIS in general but also the ability of Russia to exercise its power over the other member states more specifically (Delyagin, 2005;Wallander, 2007). Whether based on hope or fear, such an interpretation should lead us to expect increasing divergence from Russia as the new regimes would redirect the foreign policy of their respective states to reflect their opposition to Russia and to the n/a 7 n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 4 1 5 2 TUR n/a 7 n/a n/a n/a n/a 11 13 11 9 6 UKR 3 3 5 2 10 7 13 20 20 18 20 UZB n/a 9 17 20 n/a n/a 13 8 4 5 3 authoritarian rule of the Kremlin (Hagan, 1989;Morrow, 1991;Siverson & Starr, 1994).…”

Russian patronage over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: implications for conflict resolution

“…Russia's ambitions also embrace economic interests. The close intertwining of political and economic power in Russia motivates and enables its leadership to engage widely in multiple forms of economic statecraft (Wallander 2007). And finally, Russia's ambitions include the protection of Russia's internal political order against outside threats.…”

“…Russia's economic activities towards the countries of the post-Soviet area seem as much aimed at integration at the state level as at the expansion of Russia's private and state-owned companies (Wallander 2007). Russia's economy is by far the largest in the region, providing an important market, though not necessarily the largest market, for goods and labour for most of the bordering countries.…”

Democracy Promotion and Authoritarian Diffusion: The Foreign Origins of Post-Soviet Election Laws

“…Aiming to increase its influence, Russia operates both at a bilateral level and at a multilateral level. Bilaterally, Russia has been observed variously as directly manipulating election processes (Petrov & Ryabov 2006), involving national economic elites in a transnational patronage network (Wallander 2007), and punishing selected governments for 'antiRussian' policies (Makarychev 2008). Multilaterally, Russia uses intergovernmental organisations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) to further its goals.…”