2017
DOI: 10.1145/3231594
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Ryoan

Abstract: Users of modern data-processing services such as tax preparation or genomic screening are forced to trust them with data that the users wish to keep secret. Ryoan 1 protects secret data while it is processed by services that the data owner does not trust. Accomplishing this goal in a distributed setting is difficult, because the user has no control over the service providers or the computational platform. Confining code to prevent it from leaking secrets is notoriously difficult, but Ry… Show more

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Cited by 89 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 49 publications
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“…Trojan Horse) and thus steals sensitive information from the host. Designing novel approaches to prevent TEE-based untrusted computation is another topic that demands further investigation [69,110]. • TEE trust management.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Trojan Horse) and thus steals sensitive information from the host. Designing novel approaches to prevent TEE-based untrusted computation is another topic that demands further investigation [69,110]. • TEE trust management.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [68], the proposed Chiron adopted SGX and the sandbox Ryoan [69] [158] proposed Citadel that allows parties (or say data owners) holding training data and an aggregation server (or say aggregator owner) equipped with enclaves to protect their input privacy. When multiple enclaves are deployed, Citadel achieves a less than 1.73× performance slowdown.…”
Section: Research Statusmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lastly, we report research works that applied data confinement solutions -based on Software Fault Isolation -inside TEEs to protect against untrusted enclave service providers. Ryoan [13] introduced a distributed sandbox by adapting the Google Native Client (NaCl) to the enclave environment, thereby containing untrusted data-processing modules to prevent any leakage of user input data. The solution comes with a verifier and a service runtime.…”
Section: Embedding Language Runtimes In Teesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Wasm [12], initially conceived for executing high-performance native code in browsers, allows building a memory-safe, lightweight, and portable sandboxed execution environment based on restricted memory access and control flow with limited usage of resources. In the field of SFI, Ryoan [13] and Deflection [14] are notable solutions which combined SFI with TEEs. However, both suffer from performance and usability issues.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With the same trust assumption as the existing research work [16], the only trusted entity in Branchy-TEE is the Intel SGX-enabled CPU on the cloud server, which must support Local/Remote Authentication mechanisms (LA/RA) in addition to providing a trusted execution environment. Apart from that, everything in the infrastructure is untrustworthy, and the potential threats considered in Branchy-TEE are mainly from: Honest-But-Curious cloud providers, malicious co-located cloud tenants, and privileged attackers.…”
Section: B Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%