Safer Program Behavior Sharing Through Trace Wringing

Abstract

When working towards application-tuned systems, developers often find themselves caught between the need to share information (so that partners can make intelligent design choices) and the need to hide information (to protect proprietary methods or sensitive data). One place where this problem comes to a head is in the release of program traces, for example a memory address trace. A trace taken from a production server might expose details about who the users are or what they are doing, or it might even expose details of the actual computation itself (e.g. through a side channel). Engineers are often asked to make, by hand, "analogs" of their codes that would be free from such sensitive data or, may even try to describe behaviors at a high level with words. Both of these approaches lead to missed opportunities, confusion, and frustration. We propose a new problem for study, trace-wringing, that seeks to remove as much information from the trace as possible while still maintaining key characteristics of the original. We formalize this problem and show that, for a specific instance around memory traces, as little as a few thousand bits need to be shared. We demonstrate experimentally that the trace-wrung proxies behave similarly in the context of cache simulation but with bounded leakage, and examine the sensitivity of wrung traces to a class of attacks on AES encryption. CCS Concepts • Security and privacy → Information flow control.

Protecting File Activities via Deception for ARM TrustZone

“…(2) Enigma with various paddings. We use mutual information (MI), a common notion of information theory used in privacy preservation [17,21], to characterize the correlation between two random variables: (a) the access timing distribution of 1000 randomly sampled blocks on version 1 (i.e. Insecure) and (b) the access timing distribution of the same set of blocks on version 2 (i.e.…”