2006 SICE-ICASE International Joint Conference 2006
DOI: 10.1109/sice.2006.315635
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Safety Analysis of Systemic Accidents Triggered by Performance Deviation

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
12
0
2

Year Published

2006
2006
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6
2
1

Relationship

1
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 28 publications
(14 citation statements)
references
References 2 publications
0
12
0
2
Order By: Relevance
“…System failure can occur due to the interactions, even if all the components on their own are functional. As there is degree of autonomy in most aircraft, the pilot's ability to interact effectively with the system without losing too much control or situational awareness is extremely important so that in an emergency event the pilot is still able to effectively take manual control of the aircraft [11,15,49] or transition from one level of control (autopilot) to another (manual) [37], with incomplete information [46], or mode confusion [50] (dissonance between the mental model of the operator and the actual state of the technical system). The sociotechnical interactions on the flight desk are still not fully understood, particularly with respect to how they are affected by cultural influences [15], the representations of the hardware state to the pilot [46], and how the pilot builds mental awareness of the environment [51].…”
Section: Cognitive Processes and Sociotechnical Interactionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…System failure can occur due to the interactions, even if all the components on their own are functional. As there is degree of autonomy in most aircraft, the pilot's ability to interact effectively with the system without losing too much control or situational awareness is extremely important so that in an emergency event the pilot is still able to effectively take manual control of the aircraft [11,15,49] or transition from one level of control (autopilot) to another (manual) [37], with incomplete information [46], or mode confusion [50] (dissonance between the mental model of the operator and the actual state of the technical system). The sociotechnical interactions on the flight desk are still not fully understood, particularly with respect to how they are affected by cultural influences [15], the representations of the hardware state to the pilot [46], and how the pilot builds mental awareness of the environment [51].…”
Section: Cognitive Processes and Sociotechnical Interactionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since its introduction, FRAM's usefulness was demonstrated through many applications in many fields as in construction [31], manufacturing [32], healthcare [33], railway systems [34], and mostly in aviation [35] [36] [37] [38], etc. The early applications of FRAM mostly were conducted in a retroactive manner as an accident investigation method, which was indicated in the original naming of FRAM as the "Functional Resonance Accident Model" [39].…”
Section: Fram's Applications and Evolutionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Sybert et al [12] pointed out that FRAM lacked system assessment on interactions between functions and variability in performance during hazard identification in Air Traffic Control (ATC), by analyzing the elastic characteristics of ATC system and confirming the variability existing in the system behaviors [13]. Besides, FRAM was applied to analyzing air accidents, and its effectiveness was verified by Hollnagel et al [14] and Sawaragi et al [15]. FRAM has also been adopted in train control, nuclear power, and electric systems; for example, Belmonte et al [16] analyzed the safety of Automatic Train Monitoring System (ATS) through FRAM, and Macchi et al [17] applied FRAM on the maintenance in nuclear power plant to explain the principle of the local maintenance activities and the possible influences on system safety.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%