Safety assurance in NextGen and complex transportation systems

Fleming, Craig; Spencer, Matthew; Thomas, John; Leveson, Nancy G.; Wilkinson, Chris

doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2012.12.005

Cited by 72 publications

(49 citation statements)

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“…The additional factors include those that cannot be identified using fault tree analysis, including software and system design as well as system integration. Fleming et al (2012Fleming et al ( , 2013 analyzed the NextGen In-Trail Procedures (ITP) application by using the STPA analysis method and compared its results with the official NextGen ITP application analysis (RTCA/DO-312 2008). NextGen is the next generation of air traffic management systems that contains In-Trail Procedures application.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…ITP is an application of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) that allows aircraft to change flight levels in areas where current radar separation standards would prevent desirable altitude changes (Haissig and Brandao 2012). To summarize, ITP helps to increase operational efficiency and throughput in oceanic airspace (Fleming et al 2013). The authors concluded that STPA found more potential causes of the hazards considered (violation of separation requirements) than the traditional hazard analysis performed on ITP (RTCA/DO-312 2008).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Comparison of the FMEA and STPA safety analysis methods–a case study

et al. 2017

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As our society becomes more and more dependent on IT systems, failures of these systems can harm more and more people and organizations. Diligently performing risk and hazard analysis helps to minimize the potential harm of IT system failures on the society and increases the probability of their undisturbed operation. Risk and hazard analysis is an important activity for the development and operation of critical software intensive systems, but the increased complexity and size puts additional requirements on the effectiveness of risk and hazard analysis methods. This paper presents a qualitative comparison of two hazard analysis methods, failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) and system theoretic process analysis (STPA), using case study research methodology. Both methods have been applied on the same forward collision avoidance system to compare the effectiveness of the methods and to investigate what are the main differences between them. Furthermore, this study also evaluates the analysis process of both methods by using a qualitative criteria derived from the technology acceptance model (TAM). The results of the FMEA analysis were compared to the results of the STPA analysis, which were presented in a previous study. Both analyses were conducted on the same forward collision avoidance system. The comparison shows that FMEA and STPA deliver similar analysis results.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparison of the FMEA and STPA safety analysis methods–a case study

et al. 2017

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“…The traceability in a process model hierarchy can also help to review the completeness and consistency of the analysis. A more complete STPA analysis of this system, which is based on actual NextGen In-Trail Procedures, can be found in [127]. This section introduces a new procedure for rigorously and systematically identifying the hazardous control actions during the first step of STPA [138].…”

Section: Process Model Hierarchymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Experience using this approach on real systems such as spacecraft [129] and the air transportation system [127,146] has led to the identification of safety-critical requirements that were never considered during the normal development of these systems. Other examples can be found in the appendix, which includes context tables for nuclear power plant control systems that were generated using the algorithms in this section.…”

Section: The Information Needed Ismentioning

confidence: 99%

Extending and automating a Systems-Theoretic hazard analysis for requirements generation and analysis.

Thomas

2012

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3To my family and my amazing wife. You were there for me through it all;for that I am forever grateful. While STPA has proven to be effective at addressing these problems, its application thus far has been ad-hoc with no rigorous procedures or model-based design tools to guide the analysis. In addition, although no formal structure has yet been defined for STPA, the process is based on a control-theoretic framework that could be formalized and adapted to facilitate development of automated methods that assist in analyzing complex systems. This dissertation defines a formal mathematical structure underlying STPA and introduces a procedure for systematically performing an STPA analysis based on that structure. A method for using the results of the hazard analysis to generate formal safety-critical, model-based system and software requirements is also presented.Techniques to automate both the STPA analysis and the requirements generation are introduced, as well as a method to detect conflicts between safety requirements and other functional model-based requirements during early development of the system.

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“…Desta forma é delimitado o escopo da análise feita pelo STPA e se evita que gaste-se tempo com a busca de ações e causas que não estejam ligados com o que está sendo analisado (FLEMING et al, 2013). …”

Section: Fonte: Adaptado De Leveson E Thomas (2013)unclassified

Metodologia de análise de impacto em segurança crítica da automação das tarefas do controlador de tráfego aéreo da torre de controle de aeródromo.

Dirickson¹

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AGRADECIMENTOSPrimeiro para a minha esposa, Karolyne, que me apoiou e ajudou nessa jornada que foi para nós dois, ambos estudantes de mestrado. Esse trabalho só foi possível ser terminado porque você estava ao meu lado, eu te amo! Para a minha família, em especial meu pai Luiz e mãe Margarete, por serem um porto seguro nos fim de semanas estressados.Para o meu professor e orientador, prof Dr. João Batista Camargo Jr, por ter me recebido tão respeitosa e alegremente em uma área que não tinha nada a ver com a minha, por ter me orientado e guiado nesses anos de mestrado e por ter depositado tanta confiança no meu trabalho. Ao Lúcio Vismari pela coorientação informal dada por tanto tempo, me ensinando como ser um pesquisador. Aos outros amigos e membros do GAS (Grupo depois na análise subsequente dos cenários antes da automação e depois da automação utilizando a técnica Systems-Theoretic Proccess Analysis (STPA), criada a partir do STAMP, para levantar os fatores causais de perigos e seus requisitos de segurança em cada cenário, de forma a ser possível obter uma comparação do que foi modificado com a automação proposta das tarefas. Para validar a metodologia, foi analisada uma tarefa do ATCo da TWR como exemplo. Espera-se obter com a metodologia proposta uma forma mais objetiva e sistêmica de obter o possível impacto em termos de segurança crítica da automação de uma tarefa específica, sendo possível então determinar qual a melhor forma de se pensar essa automação no contexto do ATCo, podendo assim contribuir para a modernização segura do sistema ATM.Palavras-chave: Segurança, ATC, TWR, Engenharia de Sistemas. ABSTRACTWith the increasing growth of aviation as mode of transportation for people and cargo, the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is on its limits. In order to cope with that, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), together with country members, developed a new ATM concept called CNS/ATM, bearing several technological improvements with the objective of enhancing capacity and performance of the system, where many of these improvements are automated tasks of human operators, pilots and air traffic controllers (ATCo). In time, it was seen that technological improvements were not enough it was necessary a greater integration between all ATM systems, which would guarantee an interoperability between them. Therefore, the CNS/ATM concept evolved to a Global ATM concept, in which the modernization plan would occur globally and integrated, including many of the improvements of the CNS/ATM concept. This paradigm shift raised several questions on how these changes would affect in the actual system from an economic, environmental, performance and safety points of view. To understand the hazards of the new tasks, several traditional techniques and models are used, like Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Error Tree Analysis (ETA). These traditional techniques see accidents because of a chain of failure events, all with an effect-cause relation. This assumption is no longer considered enough in order to unders...

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Safety assurance in NextGen and complex transportation systems

Cited by 72 publications

References 2 publications

Comparison of the FMEA and STPA safety analysis methods–a case study

Comparison of the FMEA and STPA safety analysis methods–a case study

Extending and automating a Systems-Theoretic hazard analysis for requirements generation and analysis.

Metodologia de análise de impacto em segurança crítica da automação das tarefas do controlador de tráfego aéreo da torre de controle de aeródromo.

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