Safety Culture, Resilient Behavior, and Stress in Air Traffic Management

Abstract

Abstract. In today’s rapidly changing air traffic management (ATM) environment, safety culture and organizational resilience are seen as key enablers for effective safety management. Under normal conditions a positive safety culture is known to be reflected in proactive behavior and to serve as indirect indicator of organizational resilience. But how are safety culture development and resilient behavior affected by psychological stress? This study aims at relating safety culture to resilient behavior and psychological stress of 282 air traffic controllers, air traffic safety electronics personnel, and meteorologists. Results demonstrate that safety culture across different occupational groups is difficult to assess, but that facets of safety culture can be meaningfully related to resilient behavior. Structural equation modeling indicates that psychological stress has a positive effect on resilient behavior and a negative effect on safety culture development. Findings are discussed in the safety management context of the ATM system including air traffic control, engineering, and meteorological services. Finally, conclusions are drawn with a view on providing an initial position for future studies.

Revisiting high-reliability organizing: obstacles to safety and resilience

“…Although these five principles offer much insight into what effective high-reliability organizing requires, there are myriad communicative actions undermining any attempt to improve safety and reliability in HROs. Efforts to identify the mechanisms to overcome these communicative challenges often produce similar conclusions: need for training (Wilson et al, 2005), more focus on teams ( Jahn, 2016), and a preoccupation with safety culture (Cooper, 2000;Schwarz et al, 2016). What is largely missing from the discussion is a more nuanced understanding of how constructions of identity and the distinctive information environment within HROs complicate these five principles.…”

“…In response to operational failures, organizations must be able to bounce back and learn from past mistakes. Scholars have noted several building blocks of resilience, such as a strong safety culture (Schwarz et al, 2016), after-action reviews (Allen et al, 2010), emergency preparedness training (Chen et al, 2017), and mindful reflection practices (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007). At the core of each recommendation is the motivation to learn, which helps employees challenge normative practices that lead to complacency and inattention to details: Time and again, a key lesson extracted with hindsight from accident histories is that the affected organization(s) failed to learn from previous accidents and/or failed to recognize accident precursors that would have warned more insightful organizations of their drift towards disaster (Crichton et al, 2009, p. 25).…”

21st International Symposium on Aviation Psychology

“…Within the scope of an SMS, a resilient safety culture is known to be reflected in proactive and resilient behaviors of personnel in an organization and also serves as indirect indicator of good organizational management factors (Schwarz, Wolfgang, & Gaisbachgrabner, 2016). Resilient safety culture within the aviation environment has been promoted through extant research (Akselsson, Koorneef, Stewart & Ward, 2009;Reason, 2011;Schwarz, Wolfgang, & Gaisbachgrabner, 2016) and the findings of these research advocate for robust and resilient safety systems as the next level in an organization with a fully functional SMS program in place. Some collegiate aviation programs in the U.S. have adopted the SMS voluntary program (SMSVP) facilitated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).…”

A Competency Framework for Aviation Psychologists and Human Factors Specialists in Aviation

“…The concept of competence in aviation is not new. Core competencies including safety-relevant behavior markers (e.g., Group Interaction in High-Risk Environment [GIHRE], 2001) are available to describe the proficient performance of pilots (e.g., Flin et al 2003Flin et al , 2008Mansikka et al, 2017), flight instructors (Thomas & Richards, 2015), cabin crew (Simpson et al, 2004), air traffic controllers (e.g., Eißfeldt, 2000;Eißfeldt et al, 2009;Schwarz & Kallus, 2015;Schwarz et al, 2016), aircraft maintenance technicians (e.g., Gunes et al, 2020), air medical transport staff (nurses, physicians, paramedics; e.g., Slimmer et al, 2022), and aeromedical examiners/aerospace medicine physicians (e.g., Aerospace Medical Association [ASMA], 2023; Commission Regulation (EU), 2012(EU), , 2018Yh, 2016). In terms of competency assessment, the model of KSA prevails (McClelland, 1973).…”