Safety Evidence Traceability: Problem Analysis and Model

Nair, Sunil; Melzi, Alberto; Tagliaferri, Giorgio; De-La-Beaujardiere, Laurent; Belmonte, Fabien

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-05843-6_23

Cited by 14 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…It is very important that a user is aware of the possible limitations in SACM usage. For safety evidence management activities beyond the scope of a safety case, we argue that SACM is not the best alternative and that other models better support the whole safety evidence lifecycle (e.g., [20,51]). We also consider that provision of evidence in general and in SACM in particular should be artefact-centred.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…SACM has been mostly referred to as an initiative that exists (e.g., [18]) or with which a correspondence could be established (e.g., [19]). Publications on safety evidence management [20], safety argumentation [4], safety compliance [19], and security assurance [21] have referred to SACM. We further concluded that detailed SACM analyses were necessary, including analyses of SACM suitability for specific purposes.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prior work has proposed non-standard models for managing safety evidence [19]. Some are generic (e.g., [20]) and others have been created for safety evidence management according to specific safety standards, e.g. IEC 61508 [30].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We think that information should be regarded as evidence only when it is available in some artefact, which could be used as evidence. We have previously discussed [20,22] that an artefact is not safety evidence in itself, in isolation, but that an artefact can be used as evidence of some safety claim. For example, a hazard log is an artefact that can be used as evidence of the claim 'system hazards have been identified'.…”

Section: Notion Of Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

An analysis of safety evidence management with the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel

Génova

Álvarez-Rodríguez

Lloréns

2017

Computer Standards & Interfaces

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Notion Of Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

An analysis of safety evidence management with the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel

Génova

Álvarez-Rodríguez

Lloréns

2017

Computer Standards & Interfaces

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Therefore, the RAF metamodel corresponds to safety standard-independent modelling.! The approaches that have addressed this type of modelling focus on specific safety compliance needs such as the requirements to fulfil [39], the artefacts to manage [40], artefact traceability [41], and the process to follow [12,[42][43][44]. Safety cases have also been used for the analysis of safety standards in order to determine the safety arguments in the standards and thus how safety is or should be justified [45][46][47][48][49][50].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Model-based specification of safety compliance needs for critical systems: A holistic generic metamodel

Ruíz

Attwood

Espinoza

et al. 2016

Information and Software Technology

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version -refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher's website. TakedownIf you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. Model-Based Specification of Safety Compliance Needs for CriticalSystems: A Holistic Generic Metamodel! Abstract!Context: Many critical systems must comply with safety standards as a way of providing assurance that they do not pose undue risks to people, property, or the environment. Safety compliance is a very demanding activity, as the standards can consist of hundreds of pages and practitioners typically have to show the fulfilment of thousands of safety-related criteria. Furthermore, the text of the standards can be ambiguous, inconsistent, and hard to understand, making it difficult to determine how to effectively structure and manage safety compliance information. These issues become even more challenging when a system is intended to be reused in another application domain with different applicable standards.Objective: This paper aims to resolve these issues by providing a metamodel for the specification of safety compliance needs for critical systems. Method: The metamodel is holistic and generic, and abstracts common concepts for demonstrating safety compliance from different standards and application domains. Its application results in the specification of Òreference assurance frameworksÓ for safety-critical systems, which correspond to a model of the safety criteria of a given standard. For validating the metamodel with safety standards, parts of several standards have been modelled by both academic and industry personnel, and other standards have been analysed. We further augment this with feedback from practitioners, including feedback during a workshop. Results:The results from the validation show that the metamodel can be used to specify safety compliance needs for aerospace, automotive, avionics, defence, healthcare, machinery, maritime, oil and gas, process industry, railway, and robotics. Practitioners consider that the metamodel can meet their needs and find benefits in its use. Conclusion:The metamodel supports the specification of safety compliance needs for most critical computer-based and software-intensive systems. The resulting models can provide an effective means of structuring and managing safety compliance infor...

show abstract

Challenges of Scaled Agile for Safety-Critical Systems

Steghöfer

Knauss

Horkoff

et al. 2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Automotive companies increasingly adopt scaled agile methods to allow them to deal with their organisational and product complexity. Suitable methods are needed to ensure safety when developing automotive systems. On a small scale, R-Scrum and SafeScrum ® are two concrete suggestions for how to develop safety-critical systems using agile methods. However, for large-scale environments, existing frameworks like SAFe or LeSS do not support the development of safety-critical systems out of the box. We, therefore, aim to understand which challenges exist when developing safety-critical systems within large-scale agile industrial settings, in particular in the automotive domain. Based on an analysis of R-Scrum and SafeScrum ® , we conducted a focus group with three experts from industry to collect challenges in their daily work. We found challenges in the areas of living traceability, continuous compliance, and organisational flexibility. Among others, organisations struggle with defining a suitable traceability strategy, performing incremental safety analysis, and with integrating safety practices into their scaled way of working. Our results indicate a need to provide practical approaches to integrate safety work into large-scale agile development and point towards possible solutions, e.g., modular safety cases.

show abstract

Safety Evidence Traceability: Problem Analysis and Model

Cited by 14 publications

References 21 publications

An analysis of safety evidence management with the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel

An analysis of safety evidence management with the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel

Model-based specification of safety compliance needs for critical systems: A holistic generic metamodel

Challenges of Scaled Agile for Safety-Critical Systems

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About