Safety of quantified ABoxes w.r.t. singleton ε L policies

Abstract

In recent work, we have shown how to compute compliant anonymizations of quantified ABoxes w.r.t. EL policies. In this setting, quantified ABoxes can be used to publish information about individuals, some of which are anonymized. The policy is given by concepts of the Description Logic (DL) EL, and compliance means that one cannot derive from the ABox that some non-anonymized individual is an instance of a policy concept. If one assumes that a possible attacker could have additional knowledge about some of the involved non-anonymized individuals, then compliance with a policy is not sufficient. One wants to ensure that the quantified ABox is safe in the sense that none of the secret instance information is revealed, even if the attacker has additional compliant knowledge. In the present paper, we show that safety can be decided in polynomial time, and that the unique optimal safe anonymization of a non-safe quantified ABox can be computed in exponential time, provided that the policy consists of a single EL concept.