Salafism, liberalism, and democratic learning in Tunisia

Abstract

The article charts the rise of the jihadi Salafi movement in Tunisia during the transitional period and analyses the way in which the national attempt to construct a more liberal and democratic system influenced its internal dynamics and debate. It highlights in particular how democratic mechanisms and liberal norms being put in place in Tunisia impacted on the movement and how then this was reflected in its interactions with the other social and political actors in the system. The unique Tunisian environment in which democratic mechanisms and individual liberal freedoms were introduced immediately after the revolution led the jihadi Salafi movement to operate through contradictory behaviour and actions in a process of what can be called 'stop-start' democratic learning, which ultimately failed. The novelty of the political arrangements was beneficial to jihadi Salafism initially, as the new liberal environment allowed it to proselytise and organise in the open while railing against democracy and liberalism. In doing so they unwillingly contributed to strengthen the consensus of political actors on the necessity to build a democratic system. However, under the weight of this contradictory attitude, the movement ended up threatening the transition and failed to integrate.

Learning mechanisms within an Islamist party: Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement between domestic and regional balances

“…It was only in August 2013 that the government officially declared the Salafi jihadi group of Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organisation. The reversal of the initial inclusion-driven approach to it (Cavatorta, 2015) to a more securitised approach (Marks, 2017a) offers an example of Ennahda's learning within the context of growing domestic hostility and the changing regional and international environment.…”

Closing the Arab Democratic Gap: A Re-Assessment of the Tunisian Democratic Transition

“…Despite this frenzy, the main organized movements that benefitted from this opening were the Salafist parties and currents that had long been repressed. Cavatorta also singled out the fall of the Ben Ali regime as the principal cause of their emergence as the accompanying freedom of expression allowed them to mobilize and recruit more easily, all the while not opposing democracy itself but only its more liberal components (Marks, 2018;Cavatorta, 2015). These movements had widely different interpretations of the role of Islam in politics, especially compared to Ennahda: "the moderate politicalreligious interpretation of Islam that […] was then diffused among the followers of an-Nahda for many years, was very distant from the ultra-conservative doctrine spread by supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir" and one of its pillars "was that the biggest enemy of Islam is not relaxation of its precepts but rather tyranny and the traditionalist interpretation of religion that is a common aspect of radical Salafism" (Martinez Fuentes, 2017, p. 181).…”

Tunisia’s Institutional Change after the Revolution

“…The main actors involved in the revolution were youth and labour movements which had socio-democratic demands, such as fighting against unemployment and liberal neopatrimonial regimes (Hanafi, 2012). The Trade Union UGGT quickly mobilized a lot of people in order to overthrow the regime of Ben Ali and afterwards played the role of mediator between all the political parties and civil society organizations to favour the transition (Cavatorta, 2015). Collective mobilization has been relevant since the 2008 protests in Gafsa; in the wake of the 2011 uprising, collective mobilization was able to exert political influence on the elites and institutions through conflictual action.…”