Sameness and the self: philosophical and psychological considerations

Abstract

In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries—e.g., how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example, Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.

Autonoetic consciousness: Reconsidering the role of episodic memory in future-oriented self-projection

“…This is not to imply that episodic memory cannot play any role in FMTT. Rather, it means that episodic memory is not a necessary constituent of most forms of temporal self-projection (e.g., Klein, 2013d) and that the term "episodic", used in reference to future-oriented mentation, does more to obfuscate than illuminate the neurocognitive operations mediating future-oriented imaginings involving the self (Mathen, 2010).…”

“…While evidentiary grounding provided by stored content may be needed for certain forms of FMTT (reviewed in Klein, 2013a), it never is sufficient. In fact, for some forms of future-oriented mentation it is not required at all (e.g., Klein, 2013d).…”

“…Testing, however, revealed that at least some of this was due to autonoetic impairment (e.g., he was able to accurately recount a few specific incidents from his past, but unable to situate them in the proper temporal context). Testing revealed severe temporal disorientation (e.g., Klein, 2013d;Klein, Rozendal, et al, 2002).…”

“…Since some forms of FMTT travel do not require access to previously acquired content (e.g., personal diachronicity; Klein, 2013d), atemporal, system-agnostic content cannot be necessary for FMTT in all its manifestations. 4 However, even when content is required, in the absence of a sense of subjective temporality it is left without temporal compass.…”

“…While this case stimulates a host of fascinating questions about self and memory (some of which are addressed in Klein, 2012Klein, , 2013dKlein, , 2014a, the important points for present purposes are (a) autonoetic consciousness is not an intrinsic property of retrieved content (see also Tulving, 2005), (b) content that contains all of the criterial features and richness of detail associated with episodic recollection can be present in awareness, yet not experienced as a personal reliving, and (c) the same (or largely indistinguishable) content can be taken as "inferentially from my past" or "directly from my past" depending on the functional integrity of the mechanisms (presently unknown) that conjoin experienced content and autonoetic consciousness at retrieval.…”