Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy

Kustra, Tyler

doi:10.1177/00220027211042681

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…A large Russian diaspora in MEPs' home countries is associated with increased support for financial aid and trade with Ukraine, across all models and with conventional levels of significance. Following Kustra (2020), it is possible that a large share of Russian immigrants in EU member states are not supportive of their kin-state's preferred policy, and may be willing to punish Russia through policies that are oppose its interests. Similarly, Eastern European MEPs are more likely to support EU-Ukraine cooperation and not follow the pro-Russian policy.…”

Section: Findings and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The role of immigrant groups and diasporas in policy-making has been studied for decades in international relations (Bermeo and Leblang, 2015). Immigrant groups tend to lobby host country governments on policies towards to their kin-state (Bermeo and Leblang, 2015: 627), although these policies may range between support for kin-state governments and punishing the kin-state through economic sanctions (Kustra, 2020).…”

Section: Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Foreign economic policy in the European Parliament and economic interdependence with foreign powers

Norrevik

2021

European Union Politics

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What is the role of economic interdependence with foreign powers when legislators vote on foreign policies? Foreign aid and trade are among the European Union’s most important foreign policy instruments, over which the European Parliament has veto power. Yet, few studies address foreign economic policy voting in European Parliament scholarship. This study presents a new theoretical model about economic interdependence and foreign policy positioning in the European Parliament. I argue that economic interdependence with major foreign powers is associated with legislators’ foreign policy positions. Analysing European Parliament votes concerning aid and trade with Ukraine, I show a statistical association between Members of the European Parliaments with high levels of Russian Foreign Direct Investment in their electoral districts and voting against aid and trade with Ukraine (supporting the pro-Russian policy). These findings offer new insights on Members of the European Parliaments’ position-taking in foreign economic policy decisions that have global economic and political ramifications.

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Section: Findings and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foreign economic policy in the European Parliament and economic interdependence with foreign powers

Norrevik

2021

European Union Politics

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“…In this article, I revisit the diversionary theory, adapting it to the use of economic sanctions by US presidents. For some time now, scholars have looked into the influence of domestic conditions on the initiation of sanctions (Drury, 2001(Drury, , 2005Kustra, 2022;Tama, 2020). They provide us with mixed findings on the link between the domestic economy and sanctions onset: While early studies showed that higher levels of unemployment are associated with a greater likelihood of sanctions imposition (Drury, 2001), later research pointed in the opposite direction, demonstrating that a weak economy constrains the president from using sanctions (Drury, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divert when it does not hurt: The initiation of economic sanctions by US presidents from 1989 to 2015

Attia

2023

Rev International Economics

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A dominant argument in the literature is that leaders tend to initiate military disputes in periods plagued by economic distress. This article revisits the diversionary theory and adapts it to the use of economic sanctions in the United States, contending that their use follows a similar diversionary logic. Using a novel dataset on US sanctions from 1989 to 2015, I find that presidents are more likely to use sanctions when unemployment is high and the president's party power in Congress is weak. I show that when doing so presidents opt for sanctions that inflict little harm on the US economy.

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“…The contribution of this article is to expand our understanding of sanctioning behavior while maintaining the simple, two-player setup. Kustra (2022) considers how domestic political advocacy by immigrant groups affects sanctions and finds that the president caters to diasporas when they form an important voting block in swing states.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic sanctions as deterrents and constraints

Kustra

2022

Journal of Peace Research

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This article analyses economic sanctions starting from the perspective of a target that has to allocate its income between spending on resources to pursue a contentious policy and consumption goods. By studying the target’s consumption problem, it demonstrates how sanctions could backfire causing the target to shift its spending to resources to pursue the contentious policy, thereby increasing the severity of the policy. Whether this will come to pass depends on the elasticities of substitution, which are determined by the target’s utility function. Therefore, even sanctions that seem like they could do no harm, such as embargoes on luxury goods consumed by only the target’s dictator, could aggravate the level of the policy given the right utility function. Considering the target’s consumption problem also illustrates how sanctions could (depending on the form of the target’s utility function) reduce the resources it could allocate to pursuing the contentious policy, thereby moderating it. If the benefits of this constraint outweigh the costs of sanctions to the sender, it could be in the sender’s best interest to impose sanctions. In these cases articulating a demand and waiting for the target to consider it would simply provide the target with additional time to continue the contentious policy, so the sender would impose constraining sanctions without warning. Constraining sanctions, therefore, provide an explanation for sanctions imposed without a threat stage. Constraining sanctions can occur even with complete and perfect information and may persist indefinitely, explaining the existence of long-term costly sanctions as well as sanctions that occur in cases of full information.

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Sanctioning the Homeland: Diasporas’ Influence on American Economic Sanctions Policy

Cited by 10 publications

References 70 publications

Foreign economic policy in the European Parliament and economic interdependence with foreign powers

Foreign economic policy in the European Parliament and economic interdependence with foreign powers

Divert when it does not hurt: The initiation of economic sanctions by US presidents from 1989 to 2015

Economic sanctions as deterrents and constraints

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