Sanctions

State-owned MNCs and host country expropriation risk: The role of home state soft power and economic gunboat diplomacy

“…The sanctions literature has recognized the incentives for the sender and the target to reach a compromise before sanctions impositions: such a compromise would allow the two sides to avoid inefficient economic conflict (Eaton, 1999). Therefore, economic coercion is more likely to end at the threat stage than the imposition stage so that the sender achieves its goals due to the coercive effect of threats (Eaton & Engers, 1992).…”

Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data

“…Sender Costs Recorded 1 if the cost to the sender was either severe or major (TIES) Smart/Targeted Sanction Positive: Morgan and Schwebach (1996), Cortright and Lopez (2002) Morgan and Schwebach (1996) [+], Shagabutdinova and Berejikian (2007) Miyagawa (1992), van Bergeijk (1994), Bonetti (1998) van Bergeijk (1994 [+], Hufbauer et al (2007) [+], Drury (1998) (Drezner 2003;Eaton and Engers 1992;Krustev 2010;Lacy and Niou 2004;Morgan and Miers 1999;Smith 1996). They suggest that sanctions policies might actually be more effective than the previous studies suggest, but to observe this, we also have to consider cases in which sanctions were threatened, but not imposed.…”

Watta Satta: Bride Exchange and Women's Welfare in Rural Pakistan

“…In total, we are able to match over 500 sister-in-law pairs of whom 55% are linked by watta satta. 7 To test for differences in concordance across marriage types, while controlling for variables such as the duration of marriage, we use a simple regression-based procedure. Let y i be an outcome, such as estrangement, for woman i and y s i be the same outcome for her sister-in-law.…”