Sanctions in the CalWORKs Program

Abstract

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Evaluation of the SB 1041 Reforms to California's CalWORKs Program: Background and Study Design

“…As noted earlier, SB 1104, in addition to tightening the CalWORKs participation requirement, also mandated a study of the CalWORKs sanction policy. That evaluation of the implementation of the CalWORKs sanction policy as of 2004 determined that sanctions were weaker than intended because of how they were implemented by caseworkers reluctant to impose them (Klerman and Burstain, 2008). Moreover, there was sizeable variation across counties in sanction implementation.…”

“…Finally, beyond the differences in characteristics, we note that Riverside and Los Angeles are of interest as focal counties because of their long-standing work-first WTW models, having been the subject of experimental evaluations during the AFDC waiver period (Freedman, Friedlander, et al, 2000;Freedman, Knab, et al, 2000). Those two counties, as well as Alameda and Sacramento counties, have also been included in evaluations of various CalWORKs reforms (Crow et al, 2006;London and Mauldon, 2006;Klerman and Burstain, 2008;Zellman et al, 1999).…”

“…The Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Study (conducted by the RAND Corporation and the University of California, Los Angeles [UCLA]): 3,250 households in Los Angeles were followed betweenand 2008(Sastry et al, 2006. • The California Health Interview Survey (conducted by UCLA): this is an ongoing crosssectional study of 50,000 Californians (UCLA Center for Health Policy Research, 2012).…”

Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation: A Review of the Patent Pilot Program's Impact on Appellate Reversal Rates at the Five-Year Mark

“…279 Parties may engage in judge shopping. 280 Some districts, like the Eastern District of Texas, facilitate this practice by letting parties essentially choose their judge by deciding in which division within the district to file, which could impact the results. 281 Indeed, the Eastern District of Texas has continued this practice even though the rules of the pilot program officially provide for random assignment.…”