Sandfontein: An Operational Re-examination of the Battle, Contextualised within General J.C. Smuts’ First Phase of the German South West African Campaign 1914

Abstract

The battle of Sandfontein November 26, 1914 marked the fledgeling Union Defence Force’s first defeat. Historians have used this long-forgotten battle as a lens to view the divisive political and military aspects of the Union’s early history. Unfortunately, some of their scholarship has passed through a distorted lens. Official histories were the first to obfuscate military and leadership shortcomings and interfere with the operational context surrounding Sandfontein. Theirs was for political reasons—a mission to protect delicate reputations and mollify a divided population. Historians have erroneously assumed that General J.C. Smuts’ initial plan for the invasion of German South West Africa 1914 was modified to exclude Walvis Bay/Swakopmund’s occupation. Instead, delays in occupying Walvis Bay/Swakopmund placed the UDF’s forces at Lüderitzbucht in a precarious position. Sandfontein, a desperate attempt to distract the Schutztruppe, was an operational failure, rather than the tactical faux pas portrayed by historians.

On contested shores: The evolving role of amphibious operations in the history of warfare

“…During the First World War, Union Defence Force troops were involved in limited amphibious operations during the South African invasion of German South-West Africa (modern Namibia) -particularly at Port Nolloth and Lüderitzbucht in 1914. 603 Several years later, South African troops once more took part in amphibious operations during the final phase of the Madagascar Campaign during the Second World War. Both these instances of amphibious operations by South African troops were anomalies, with no distinct marine capability or doctrine within the defence force at the time.…”