Sarbanes-Oxley

Formulation Development, Statistical Optimization, In Vitro and In Vivo Evaluation of Etoricoxib-Loaded Eucalyptus Oil-Based Nanoemulgel for Topical Delivery

“…Thus, the formulation of ETB-NEG is a promising approach for the enhancement of analgesic activity. Similar results of enhancement of the analgesic activity of diclofenac sodium by the formulation of its NEG are reported [44]. Enhanced skin permeation of the drug, when applied as its NEG formulation, contributes significantly to the effect.…”

A critical evaluation of the European credit default swap reform: Its challenges and adverse effects as a result of insufficient assumptions

“…On the other hand, the combination of a concentrated and interconnected CDS market with an inherent opaque nature made it difficult to assess the vulnerability of counterparties (for example, Lehman Brothers) causing panic and regulators' passivity. 83 However, the CDS market transactions remained relatively stable 84 and worked well as large settlements were orchestrated organised 85 (agreed by senior regulators in both the United Kingdom and the United States 86 ), as the example of Lehman proves. Although rumours circulated that US$400 billion could have been referenced to Lehman, 87 the notional amount reported by DTCC was US$72 billion and the actual amount changing hands only US$5.2 billion 88 as the many entities were both buyers and sellers of protection on Lehman (recall the concentrated market structure).…”

“…93 Importantly, this was not the case for the insurance company AIG, who mainly operated as a protection seller 94 -and a huge one: AIG's net notional amount of protection sold (US$493 billion) was double the size of all other dealers' aggregate positions. 95 AIG could build up this position as it subsidiary AIG Financial Products (AIGFP): (i) sold CDS protection that were neither regulated as insurance contracts 96 nor as a bank (which would have required them to hold capital against potential CDS payouts) 97 ; (ii) could attract counterparties due to its AAA rating which allowed AIG (parent) to guarantee AIGFPs obligations 98 and therefore neither had to post collateral (until a certain point) and which thus enabled them to provide cheaper fees for counterparties 96 ; (iii) and because commercial bank counterparties could achieve regulatory relief on their trading books under Basel 1 upon the purchase of CDSs (on CDOs) from monoline insurers. 99 Importantly, all this would have mattered less if the underlying mortgage-backed securities 100 were priced accurately.…”

“…This is in sharp contrast to the privately negotiated OTC market in which the reference entity is not aware of the transaction between the protection buyer-and seller. 244 Regulatory inconsistency: short sell ban of naked sovereign CDS It appears problematic and inconsistent that the most frequently traded product (sovereign CDSs) 245 and therefore the product best suited for exchange trading is the very same product that the new proposal regulation Short Selling and certain aspects of CDS 246 will restrict, thus making it less liquid and traded less frequently. The regulation proposes a regulatory framework and harmonisation for short selling as a response to member countries' divergent approach to the restriction of short selling of, for example, naked CDS on sovereign debt to avoid increased borrowing cost for indebted countries (for example, PIIGS countries).…”