2024
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13017
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Sartre's Exclusion Claim: Perception and Imagination as Radically Distinct Consciousnesses

Jonathan Mitchell

Abstract: In The Imaginary Jean‐Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience ‐ I call this the exclusion claim. This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre's exclusion claim. First, it frames the claim in terms of cross‐modal attention distribution, such that it is not possible to simultaneously attend to what one is imagining and what one is perceiving. However, this leaves it open that a subject can simultaneously i… Show more

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