2022
DOI: 10.1017/s0003055422000028
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Saving Migrants’ Basic Human Rights from Sovereign Rule

Abstract: States cannot legitimately enforce their borders against migrants if dominant conceptions of sovereignty inform enforcement because these conceptions undermine sufficient respect for migrants’ basic human rights. Instead, such conceptions lead states to assert total control over outsiders’ potential cross-border movements to support their in-group’s self-rule. Thus, although legitimacy requires states to prioritize universal respect for basic human rights, sovereign states today generally fail to do so when it… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 51 publications
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“…Although they do not dismiss the possibility that these conditions are met, and some even allow that immigration restrictions are justified in principle, it should come as no surprise that all of them conclude that these conditions are not met under current circumstances and so immigration restrictions are not justified in practice. For instance, according to Mendoza (2014: 80), “anti-discriminatory commitments cannot coexist with a state’s presumptive right to control immigration, at least not if we take enforcement into consideration.” Fine (2016: 141) concedes that “some form of right to exclude is defensible in principle, under the correct conditions, but these arguments in support of a right to exclude are not applicable in the here and now, in the world as we know it, in circumstances far from ideal.” In the same vein, Schmid (2022: 965) argues that “[e]ven if they [states] are permitted to make sweeping rules of exclusion, this does not entail that they are permitted to enforce such rules.” Finally, Sager (2017: 48) concludes that:even if there are reasons at the level of principle that states’ claims to regulate migration outweigh the competing claims of many people to migrate, practical difficulties in avoiding dominating migrants in the process of enforcing migration controls make them unjust. The result is that the nature of immigration administration and enforcement commits us to much more open borders even if there are in principle good normative reasons for allowing states to restrict immigration .…”
Section: Unenforced Immigration Restrictionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although they do not dismiss the possibility that these conditions are met, and some even allow that immigration restrictions are justified in principle, it should come as no surprise that all of them conclude that these conditions are not met under current circumstances and so immigration restrictions are not justified in practice. For instance, according to Mendoza (2014: 80), “anti-discriminatory commitments cannot coexist with a state’s presumptive right to control immigration, at least not if we take enforcement into consideration.” Fine (2016: 141) concedes that “some form of right to exclude is defensible in principle, under the correct conditions, but these arguments in support of a right to exclude are not applicable in the here and now, in the world as we know it, in circumstances far from ideal.” In the same vein, Schmid (2022: 965) argues that “[e]ven if they [states] are permitted to make sweeping rules of exclusion, this does not entail that they are permitted to enforce such rules.” Finally, Sager (2017: 48) concludes that:even if there are reasons at the level of principle that states’ claims to regulate migration outweigh the competing claims of many people to migrate, practical difficulties in avoiding dominating migrants in the process of enforcing migration controls make them unjust. The result is that the nature of immigration administration and enforcement commits us to much more open borders even if there are in principle good normative reasons for allowing states to restrict immigration .…”
Section: Unenforced Immigration Restrictionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Centering the figure of the migrant and the anti-racist imperative casts doubt on this arrangement. Lukas Schmid has argued that even if states have the right to use force to exclude immigrants, they only have the moral right to enforce these rules if the institutions of exclusion robustly respect basic human rights (Schmid, 2022). Schmid adds that dominant conceptions of sovereignty that prioritize control and authority makes robust support for human rights unlikely.…”
Section: Building a Radical Res Publicamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Focusing on human rights is useful for our purposes because it provides a distinctively moral basis for our argument, but which is still sensitive to actual political commitments of the EU and the constraints imposed by international law. Moreover, in the political theory literature on migration, respect for human rights is universally acknowledged as a fundamental standard for normatively assessing the legitimacy of border control (Sandven, 2022;Schmid, 2022). 2 Thus, on our view, an assessment of an institution's legitimacy depends on an analysis of how that institution impacts human rights protection compared to the non-institutional alternative and to available institutional alternatives.…”
Section: Normative Legitimacymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Focusing on human rights is useful for our purposes because it provides a distinctively moral basis for our argument, but which is still sensitive to actual political commitments of the EU and the constraints imposed by international law. Moreover, in the political theory literature on migration, respect for human rights is universally acknowledged as a fundamental standard for normatively assessing the legitimacy of border control (Sandven, 2022; Schmid, 2022).…”
Section: The Normative Legitimacy Of the Eu's Border Regimementioning
confidence: 99%