2008
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/jgn036
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Saving the WTO from the Risk of Irrelevance: The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a 'Common Good' for RTA Disputes

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Cited by 15 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…This is because the WTO-covered agreements do not identify the law that shall regulate the interpretation of the law. [32] The Panels and the Appellate Body's interpretations should only be binding on specific instances under the general international law principles. However, the Panels frequently consult prior Appellate Body decisions in related cases to avoid having their reports reversed.…”
Section: Precedents For Appellate Body Decisionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is because the WTO-covered agreements do not identify the law that shall regulate the interpretation of the law. [32] The Panels and the Appellate Body's interpretations should only be binding on specific instances under the general international law principles. However, the Panels frequently consult prior Appellate Body decisions in related cases to avoid having their reports reversed.…”
Section: Precedents For Appellate Body Decisionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…17 Most of these requirements are pre-conditions that an RTA must fulfill in order for RTA"s Members to invoke the WTO jurisdiction over disputes arising from the free trade agreement, and to justify their deviation from Most Favored Nation (MFN) obligations. 18…”
Section: A Wto Dispute Settlement Mechanismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The RTA must meet many requirements, some of which are the "substantially all trade" (GATT 1947, Article XXIV.8.b), or the "substantial sectoral coverage" requirement (GATT 1947, Article V), whether certain trade policy instruments are considered "other restrictive regulations of commerce" (GATT 1947, Article XXIV.8.a.i), and whether the interim agreements contain a schedule of the free trade area in a reasonable time (GATT, 1947, Article XXIV 5.c). Most of these requirements are pre-conditions that an RTA must fulfill for the RTA's members to invoke the WTO jurisdiction over disputes arising from the free trade agreement, and to justify their deviation from Most Favoured Nation (MFN) obligations (Gao & Lim, 2008).…”
Section: World Customs Journalmentioning
confidence: 99%