Savings in Times of Demographic Change: Lessons from the German Experience

Börsch‐Supan, Axel; Bucher‒Koenen, Tabea; Coppola, Michela; Lamla, Bettina

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2539019

Cited by 10 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 80 publications

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“…In 2001, the German government passed the so-called 'Riester' pension reform (named after Walter Riester who was the minister responsible for the reform) that strengthened the second and third pillar by partially substituting PAYG financed pensions with funded pensions (see Boersch-Supan et al 2015 for an overview). While insurance through the statutory pension insurance scheme is compulsory for employees in Germany, signing a contract for a private pension scheme in the second and third pillar of the German pension system is voluntary.…”

Section: Institutional Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do retirement savings increase in response to information about retirement and expected pensions?

Dolls

Doerrenberg

Peichl

et al. 2018

Journal of Public Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. How can retirement savings be increased? We explore a unique policy change in the context of the German pension system to study this question. As of 2005 (with a phase-in period between 2002-04), the German pension administration started to send out annual letters providing detailed and comprehensible information about the pension system and individual expected public pension payments. This reform did not change the level of pensions, but only provided information to individuals about their expected pension payments. Using German tax return data, we exploit an age discontinuity to identify the effect of these letters on the behavior of individuals. We find an increase in tax-deductible private retirement savings and provide evidence that this is not due to a crowding-out of other forms of savings. We also show that labor earnings, i.e. the most direct way to increase public pensions, increase after receiving the letter. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Codes: H550, H240, D140.

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Section: Institutional Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do retirement savings increase in response to information about retirement and expected pensions?

Dolls

Doerrenberg

Peichl

et al. 2018

Journal of Public Economics

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“…Until the end of March 2008, about 11 million contracts have been signed . Nevertheless, the impact of the subsidies on savings in terms of private annuities was negligible (B€ orsch-Supan et al, 2015;Corneo et al, 2009). This suggests that the saving volumes defined in the contracts are low and/or have replaced other forms of private annuity savings (which have anyway low volumes for the great majority of households).…”

Section: The Social Insurance Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Social Insurance and Health Inequality

Grossmann

Strulik

2019

German Economic Review

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This paper integrates into public economics a biologically founded, stochastic process of individual aging. The novel approach enables us to quantitatively characterize the optimal joint design of health and retirement policy behind the veil of ignorance for today and in response to future medical progress. Calibrating our model to Germany, our analysis suggests that the current social insurance policy instruments are set close to the (constrained) socially optimal levels, given proportional contribution rates for health and pension finance, the equivalence principle in the pension system, and a common statutory retirement age. Future progress in medical technology calls for a potentially drastic increase in health spending and a higher retirement age without lowering the pension contribution rate. Interestingly, from an ex ante point of view, medical progress and higher health spending are in conflict with the goal to reduce health inequality.

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“…La limitación de esta cesta y el aumento de los copagos han dado pie al crecimiento del aseguramiento complementario, que cubre al 95,5 por 100 de la población (OECD 2016b/7.2), generalmente realizado por mutualidades de tipo bismarckiano, mientras que el sistema hospitalario es mayoritariamente público o concertado no lucrativo cuyos servicios son abonados directamente por el seguro, no por el asegurado 12 11 Una excelente síntesis de la historia de la seguridad social francesa en lo que se refiere a la salud puede verse en la entrevista a la socióloga «bienestarista» Colette Bec (2016). En promedio, los reembolsos se limitan actualmente al 50-55 por 100 de los pagos realizados directamente.…”

Section: El Análisis Tridimensional De Las Políticas De Saludunclassified

La reforma de las pensiones y el estado de bienestar: un marco conceptual

Montero¹

2017

BICE

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Savings in Times of Demographic Change: Lessons from the German Experience

Abstract: Leiter des Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) und Direktor des SHARE-ERIC.

Cited by 10 publications

References 80 publications

Do retirement savings increase in response to information about retirement and expected pensions?

Do retirement savings increase in response to information about retirement and expected pensions?

Optimal Social Insurance and Health Inequality

La reforma de las pensiones y el estado de bienestar: un marco conceptual

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