Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGAda Annual Conference on High Integrity Language Technology 2013
DOI: 10.1145/2527269.2527277
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Saw

Abstract: Galois has developed a suite of symbolic simulation and formal analysis tools, collectively called the Software Analysis Workbench (SAW). SAW provides security analysts and engineers with the ability to generate formal models from C and Java programs and prove properties of those programs using several automated verification tools. SAW is primarily used to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations, and is able to import specifications written in Cryptol, a language developed by Galois for specify… Show more

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Cited by 13 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…• x 8 x 9 x 10 x 11 -state after second iteration The second method uses automatically generated equations (based on Cryptol implementation which is translated to the and-inverted-graphs (AIG [2])) and converts them into ANF. In this process we use SAW [9] and ABC [22] from UC Berkeley. The idea of using an equation taken from implementation was earlier explored by Courtois et al [14] to conduct an SAT attack on DES block cipher.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…• x 8 x 9 x 10 x 11 -state after second iteration The second method uses automatically generated equations (based on Cryptol implementation which is translated to the and-inverted-graphs (AIG [2])) and converts them into ANF. In this process we use SAW [9] and ABC [22] from UC Berkeley. The idea of using an equation taken from implementation was earlier explored by Courtois et al [14] to conduct an SAT attack on DES block cipher.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Its successor, DO 178C, has an entire supplement, DO 333, devoted to the use of formal methods for software verification. Most proposed cryptographic protocols are now examined with model checkers for possible exploits, and analysts can perform mostly-automated proofs that implementations of cryptographic algorithms match specifications [Carter13]. Practitioners also use model checkers to look for attack paths in networks.…”
Section: Formal Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%