Say on ESG: The Adoption of Say-on-Pay Laws and Firm ESG Performance

Pawliczek, Andrea; Carter, Mary Ellen; Zhong, Rong

doi:10.2139/ssrn.4125441

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2023

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Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The evidence in tables 5–7 can also be interpreted as institutional investors pushing for ESG Pay on behalf of shareholders that have intrinsic preferences for ESG beyond risk‐return considerations (rationale 2). The notion that institutional investors play a role in the implementation of ESG Pay is also supported by Pawliczek, Carter, and Zhong [2023], who document that the introduction of “Say on Pay” laws around the world is associated with an increase in ESG Pay.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence

Cohen

Kadach

Ormazábal

et al. 2023

J of Accounting Research

133

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 93%

Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence

Cohen

Kadach

Ormazábal

et al. 2023

J of Accounting Research

133

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show abstract

“…Note that this mean of 7.6% of CEOs' benefits being linked to ESG goals is lower than that of the broader measure of the so-called ESG contracting indicator byPawliczek et al (2023), which is 17% for the US firms Pawliczek et al (2023)…”

mentioning

confidence: 75%

ESG disclosure, CEO power and incentives and corporate risk‐taking

Ali

Zhang

2023

Euro Fin Management

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This paper investigates the impact of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure on corporate risk‐taking and how this impact is further affected by chief executive officer (CEO) power and incentives within US companies. We find that ESG disclosure decreases corporate risk‐taking based on both accounting‐based and market‐based returns. Further, we find that ESG disclosure is more effective in mitigating market‐based risk‐taking than accounting‐based risk‐taking in a firm with a powerful CEO. In contrast, CEO's ESG‐incentivized engagement bonuses weaken ESG disclosure impacts in reducing both types of risk‐taking. Our analysis helps understanding of different trade‐offs of ESG disclosure in aligning all stakeholders' benefits under different managerial‐related factors.

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Say on ESG: The Adoption of Say-on-Pay Laws and Firm ESG Performance

Cited by 2 publications

References 57 publications

Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence

Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence

ESG disclosure, CEO power and incentives and corporate risk‐taking

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