Scalable M+1st-Price Auction with Infinite Bidding Price

Hsu, Po-Chu; Miyaji, Atsuko

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-17551-0_8

Cited by 2 publications

References 26 publications

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Blockchain Based M+1st-Price Auction With Exponential Bid Upper Bound

Hsu,

Miyaji

2023

IEEE Access

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An auction is commonly used to sell limited resources in modern society. M + 1stprice auction sells M identical goods to B bidders. The top M winners can buy the goods at the M+1st-price. Each bidder sends their bids secretly as a bit-slice bidding vector to a trusted manager. Bit-slice is commonly used to compare secret values without revealing them. However, the bit-slice bidding vector also limits the upper bound of a bid as the length of the bidding vector. A binary format bidding vector was proposed to increase the bid upper bound to an exponential scale. For example, given a bidding vector with length 32, a binary format bidding vector can increase the bid upper bound from 32 to 2 32 . However, previous protocols that use binary format bidding vectors require a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) and a trusted manager. To make sure no party except the bidder itself knows its bid, our protocol does not have any managers. Instead, each bidder interacts with the Smart Contract independently. We propose a zero-knowledge proof that allows our protocol only requires partially homomorphic encryption such as an ElGamal encryption. To our best knowledge, our protocol is the first secure M + 1st-price auction protocol that can reach an exponential bid upper bound without a manager and SHE.

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