Scalar restructuring of the Chinese state: The subnational politics of development zones

Abstract

Recent studies have re-examined the implications and conceptual limitations of the theory of state rescaling in non-Western contexts. While the reconfiguration of state spaces has taken place in many countries and regions, the forces driving a state to reconfigure its spatial power and the forms of state rescaling appear to be contingent upon specific contexts. This article analyses the driving forces behind the scalar restructuring of the Chinese state and discusses how the logic as well as the form of rescaling differ from the post-Fordist experience of the West. By focusing on the frantic rush to establish special development zones, this article argues that development zones in China represent new political spaces that enable local state actors to navigate between multiple scales. Local states can manipulate the costs and benefits between a zone and its hosting locale by taking advantage of their overlapping jurisdictions across different scales. Zoning has become a scaling strategy from below. Local authorities have deployed various zoning technologies to empower themselves by manipulating the existing scalar order to their own advantage.

Small horse pulls big cart in the scalar struggles of competing administrations in Anhui Province, China

“…Here, we find a whirligig of competing local administrations, attached to and detaching themselves from a hierarchical structure of territorial state governments. Our paper highlights some of the features that colour scalar politics in China: the pre-eminence of state actors, whether central or local; the structural fixity provided by an all-pervasive hierarchical system of rank; and the flux or fluidity that stems from repeated episodes of scale revision, scale-jumping and the creation of what Ngo et al. (2017) refer to as states of exception.…”

“…The earliest, seminal move was the creation by central government of four Special Economic Zones in 1980, with a fifth added shortly after, in an attempt to bypass the local state and create vectors of economic growth (Cartier, 2001). However, in the years that followed, not only did central government continue its policy of creating special zones under its jurisdiction, but local governments followed suit to the point where even the middle-ranking Anhui Province, in which Chizhou is located, had 333 such zones by 2003 (Ngo et al, 2017). Ngo et al refer to this 'zone fever' as a bottom-up scale jumping tactic.…”

“…(2017) refer to as states of exception. We take up these points in terms of a number of policies and practices with strong scalar consequences (Chien, 2013): the first two were particularly common in the 1990s and early 2000s, the creation of development zones (Ngo et al., 2017) and the construction of new towns; the third has come increasingly to the fore over the last 15 or so years, investment in and revenue from tourist sites; and the fourth stems from the scalar dilemmas posed by the construction of new high-speed rail lines and the siting of stations for these lines (Xu, 2017).…”

“…Here we find a whirligig of competing local administrations, attached to and detaching themselves from a hierarchical structure of territorial state governments. Our paper highlights some of the features that colour scalar politics in China: the pre-eminence of state actors, whether central or local; the structural fixity provided by an all-pervasive hierarchical system of rank; and the flux or fluidity that stems from repeated episodes of scale revision, scale-jumping and the creation of what Ngo et al (2017) refer to as states of exception. We take up these points in terms of a number of policies and practices with strong scalar consequences (Chien, 2013): the first two were particularly common in the 1990s and early 2000s, the creation of development zones (Ngo et al, 2017) and the construction of new towns; the third has come increasingly to the fore over the last 15 or so years, investment in and revenue from tourist sites; and the fourth stems from the scalar dilemmas posed by the construction of new high speed rail lines and the siting of stations for these lines (Xu, 2017).…”

Leninism and Local Interests: How Cities in China Benefit from Concurrent Leadership Appointments

“…Like the SEZ status granted three decades earlier, the FTZ designation was a major political achievement for a small city and promised big economic benefits. As Ngo et al (2017) note, this arrangement-like the Hengqin New Area policy and Zhuhai's historic SEZ status-further empowered Zhuhai's already influential leaders, Ballowing local state actors to manipulate multiscalar politics to their own advantage^(p. 70).…”