Scenarios and Acceptance of Forecasts

Gregory, W. Larry; Duran, Anne

doi:10.1007/978-0-306-47630-3_23

Cited by 25 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Firstly, however, to place these challenges in context it is necessary to consider the rudimentary cognitive eVects of scenario thinking. Gregory and Duran 2001). The most reliable Wnding to emerge from this body of work is that considering a scenario leads people to believe that the events depicted could occur in reality; that is the perceived likelihood of scenario events increases or is upwardly biased (Carroll 1978;Gregory et al 1982;Anderson 1983).…”

Section: Scenarios As Cognitive Devicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to inXuencing likelihood judgments, mentally simulating a particular scenario can also incline people to engage in the behaviors simulated (Anderson 1983;Gregory et al 1982). Knowledge of the above eVects is potentially useful as a basis for persuading key organizational stakeholders to buy into the plausibility of a given scenario unfolding, thereby motivating them to take the necessary action to bring about or avoid certain outcomes (e.g., Hamel and Prahalad 1994;Gregory and Duran 2001). However, heeding scenarios can lead decision makers to overestimate signiWcantly the likelihood of particular events when they focus or anchor on a given scenario.…”

Section: Scenarios As Cognitive Devicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Increased uncertainty can be beneWcial when it reduces overconWdence in unwarranted prior assumptions (Russo and Schoemaker 1992) and increases information search to beneWt judgment accuracy (Lanzetta and Driscoll 1968). In this way, increased uncertainty following multiple scenario analysis might stimulate contingency planning and aid Xexibility (cf., Gregory and Duran 2001), when uncertainty is within tolerable limits. Yet, paradoxically, increased conWdence in subsequent judgments might constrain actors' thinking about the future.…”

Section: Effects Of Scenarios Onmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Troubling Futures: Scenarios and Scenario Planning for Organizational Decision Making

Healey

Hodgkinson

2009

The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Decision Making

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Drawing on research in the psychological sciences that has largely been overlooked in the scenario planning literature, this article argues that when used unskillfully scenarios can anchor and confine, rather than stretch and expand, strategic thinking and that constructing scenarios can itself be a biased activity, one that can induce new and amplify extant biases rather than remove them. Furthermore, unless skillfully introduced, scenario techniques can reduce or increase disproportionately the confidence and uncertainty of decision makers, leading correspondingly to misplaced optimism and threat rigidity among decision makers. In addition, the article highlights how, in some circumstances, the negative emotional impact of scenario analysis can override the potentially positive cognitive effects. Guidelines for using scenarios in organizational decision making are offered throughout.

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Section: Scenarios As Cognitive Devicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Scenarios As Cognitive Devicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Effects Of Scenarios Onmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Troubling Futures: Scenarios and Scenario Planning for Organizational Decision Making

Healey

Hodgkinson

2009

The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Decision Making

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“…However, trend-projecting forecasting techniques can also be combined with scenario projects (e.g., when more predetermined elements are taken into account, such as economic growth indicators or demographic trends) [2,34]. Generally a scenario depicts some feasible future state of an organization's environment, and it often includes the dynamic sequence of interacting events, conditions, and changes that is necessary to reach that state [18,36]. According to Kahn and Wiener [25], two pioneers in this area of analysis, scenarios focus attention on causal processes and crucial decision points.…”

Section: Scenario Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Long range healthcare capacity planning in the Netherlands

Postma

Terpstra²

2002

The European Journal of Health Economics

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This contribution discusses centralization vs. decentralization in healthcare strategic decision making, focusing on long-range planning of facilities for radiotherapy. The radiotherapy case illustrates that more centralized, comprehensive, and systematic planning and strategic decisions making may be necessary to account for inputs of various parties and decision-making levels in this area. The expertise required cannot generally be found at a local or even regional level. It requires initiatives from coordinating healthcare institutions such as the Health Council and other professional organizations.

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“…This occurs despite the fact that, as more details that are added to a forecast, it is logically less likely that the forecast will be correct. (SeeGregory and Duran, 2001, for a summary of evidence on the use of scenarios. )9 For forecasts from scientists on the first Earth Day in 1970, see http://blogs.news.com.au/heraldsun/andrewbolt/index.php/heraldsun/comments/forty_years_of_earth_day_ and_armageddon_no_closer/…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Global Warming Alarm: Forecasts from the Structured Analogies Method

Green

Armstrong

2011

SSRN Journal

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When the beach patrol raises the alarm that a shark has been sighted we know what to do, but how should we respond to an alarm that is based on predictions of what will happen 100 years from now and the person raising the alarm tells us we must make great sacrifices now to avoid the predicted catastrophe? To answer this question, we forecast effects and outcomes of the current global warming alarm using a structured analysis of analogous situations. To do this, we searched the literature and asked experts to identify phenomena that were similar to the alarm currently being raised over dangerous manmade global warming. We obtained 71 proposed analogies. Of these, 26 met our criteria that the alarm be: (1) based on forecasts of human catastrophe arising from effects of human activity on the physical environment, (2) endorsed by experts, politicians and the media, and (3) that were accompanied by calls for strong action. None of the 26 alarms were based on scientific forecasting procedures. None of the alarming forecasts were accurate. Governments took action in 23 of the analogous situations and those actions proved to be harmful in 20. The government programs remained in place after the predicted disasters failed to materialize. The global warming alarm movement appears to be the latest manifestation of a common social phenomenon: false alarms based on unscientific forecasts of human-caused environmental disasters. We predict that the alarm over forecasts of dangerous manmade global warming will, like previous similar alarms, result in harm.

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Scenarios and Acceptance of Forecasts

Cited by 25 publications

References 36 publications

Troubling Futures: Scenarios and Scenario Planning for Organizational Decision Making

Troubling Futures: Scenarios and Scenario Planning for Organizational Decision Making

Long range healthcare capacity planning in the Netherlands

The Global Warming Alarm: Forecasts from the Structured Analogies Method

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