“…Thus, admitting the possibility of a transcendent moral law and of a will aimed at its realization above the oneness of reason and philosophy, that is, above the absolute identity of subject and object, is simply unconceivable for Schelling, since it leads to an arbitrary and unviable conception of philosophy, or, better, to “unphilosophy” ( Unphilosophie ). As explained by Whistler (2013, 74),the basis for Schelling's commitment to absolute immanence is his monism. Everything is the Absolute and the Absolute is everything—and (between 1801 and 1805 at least) this “is” should be taken in the strongest possible sense.…”
Section: Schellingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Borrowing Whistler's words (2013, 75), “all there is is the immanence of the Absolute—and Schellingian reality is free from transcendent entities.” Such an immanent approach, then, is precisely what differentiates Schelling from Fichte, who advocated for a dualism resulting into the coincidence of God with a moral world order, which in turn makes this world order transcendent. Instead, Schelling argues for an understanding of immanence according to which the reality of any entity has to be maintained within nature; that is, for Schelling there is no ontological detachment between God and the world, and between Being itself and particular beings; namely, Being and God are not to be conceived of on a superior ontological level, as opposed to particular beings and things.…”
In this article, we argue that in the Jena period (1801–1803) Schelling and Hegel both rejected the conception of God as coinciding with the moral order, which they attribute to Fichte; such coincidence, in their view, turned God into a transcendent and merely moral Being. In an effort to demonstrate their distance from Fichte's view, we contend, Schelling and Hegel advocated for a metaphysical (rather than merely moral) and immanent (rather than transcendent) understanding of God, conceived in its inextricable relation with nature and self‐consciousness. We conclude by demonstrating that the cooperation between Schelling and Hegel in the Jena period led them to develop an analogous conception of immanence—which already foreshadows, however, the different directions that Schelling and Hegel take in their mature works.
“…Thus, admitting the possibility of a transcendent moral law and of a will aimed at its realization above the oneness of reason and philosophy, that is, above the absolute identity of subject and object, is simply unconceivable for Schelling, since it leads to an arbitrary and unviable conception of philosophy, or, better, to “unphilosophy” ( Unphilosophie ). As explained by Whistler (2013, 74),the basis for Schelling's commitment to absolute immanence is his monism. Everything is the Absolute and the Absolute is everything—and (between 1801 and 1805 at least) this “is” should be taken in the strongest possible sense.…”
Section: Schellingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Borrowing Whistler's words (2013, 75), “all there is is the immanence of the Absolute—and Schellingian reality is free from transcendent entities.” Such an immanent approach, then, is precisely what differentiates Schelling from Fichte, who advocated for a dualism resulting into the coincidence of God with a moral world order, which in turn makes this world order transcendent. Instead, Schelling argues for an understanding of immanence according to which the reality of any entity has to be maintained within nature; that is, for Schelling there is no ontological detachment between God and the world, and between Being itself and particular beings; namely, Being and God are not to be conceived of on a superior ontological level, as opposed to particular beings and things.…”
In this article, we argue that in the Jena period (1801–1803) Schelling and Hegel both rejected the conception of God as coinciding with the moral order, which they attribute to Fichte; such coincidence, in their view, turned God into a transcendent and merely moral Being. In an effort to demonstrate their distance from Fichte's view, we contend, Schelling and Hegel advocated for a metaphysical (rather than merely moral) and immanent (rather than transcendent) understanding of God, conceived in its inextricable relation with nature and self‐consciousness. We conclude by demonstrating that the cooperation between Schelling and Hegel in the Jena period led them to develop an analogous conception of immanence—which already foreshadows, however, the different directions that Schelling and Hegel take in their mature works.
“…Seyhan) – and concomitant with this has been an attempt to reread the writings of Goethe, Coleridge and other purported theorists of the symbol, such that much less emphasis is placed on their deployment of this concept in its fully blown form. Among these revisionist works, O'Brien (347) distinguishes Novalis' minimalist use of the symbol from the fully blown ‘Idealist’ version present in Goethe and elsewhere; Whistler argues that Schelling's theory of the symbol is ‘peculiar’ in that it makes no reference to what is transcendent and is, in fact, an instance of his thoroughgoing naturalism; and Krueger has suggested that Goethe has many competing conceptions of the symbol at play in his various theoretical writings, and that very few of them correspond to the traditional ‘romantic symbol’ described above…”
In this essay, I survey the different uses of the concept of the symbol at play in the philosophy of religion. Considering that historically theories of the symbol have frequently had significant religious presuppositions and implications, I suggest that one might expect that the symbol would play a significant role in current research. This is not the case, however, since the very specific metaphysical, linguistic and theological premises that have traditionally informed much theorisation of the symbol tend to be unpopular today. The main exception is Peircean symbolics which has recently been re‐appropriated by a variety of philosophical fields, including philosophy of religion. To open up further contexts for contemporary deployments of the symbol, I look to contemporary public and legal debates concerning the right to wear religious symbols as an area of research unjustly neglected by philosophers of religion: much of the inchoate conceptual work being done in the legal cases themselves would naturally feed into academic philosophical discussion of the symbol.
“…77‐96, Nassar (2012), Shaw (2010), and Tilliette (1979) focus on the early phase. Beiser 2022:580‐8, Galland‐Szymkowiak (2007), Vater (2000), and Whistler (2013) focus on the middle phase, the latter tracking its shift from the early phase. Gram (1981) and Estes (2010) address intellectual intuition's apparent continuity after Kant, but not within Schelling's corpus.…”
Throughout his career, Schelling assigns knowledge of the absolute first principle of philosophy to intellectual intuition.Schelling's doctrine of intellectual intuition raises two important questions for interpreters. First, given that his doctrine undergoes several changes before and after his identity philosophy, to what extent can he be said to "hold onto" the same "sense" of it by the 1830s, as he claims? Second, given that his doctrine of intellectual intuition restricts absolute idealism to what he calls a "science of reason", which he says cannot prove the absolute's existence, what other doctrine does he require in order to prove this? I will answer these questions by tracing the shifts in Schelling's doctrine of intellectual intuition from the 1790s to the 1830s and drawing out its evolving methodological role within his science of intelligibility.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
