Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self

Abstract

In recent years, there has been much focus on the apparent heterogeneity of schizophrenic symptoms. By contrast, this article proposes a unifying account emphasizing basic abnormalities of consciousness that underlie and also antecede a disparate assortment of signs and symptoms. Schizophrenia, we argue, is fundamentally a self-disorder or ipseity disturbance (ipse is Latin for "self" or "itself") that is characterized by complementary distortions of the act of awareness: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. Hyperreflexivity refers to forms of exaggerated self-consciousness in which aspects of oneself are experienced as akin to external objects. Diminished self-affection or self-presence refers to a weakened sense of existing as a vital and self-coinciding source of awareness and action. This article integrates recent psychiatric research and European phenomenological psychiatry with some current work in cognitive science and phenomenological philosophy. After introducing the phenomenological approach along with a theoretical account of normal consciousness and self-awareness, we turn to a variety of schizophrenic syndromes. We examine positive, then negative, and finally disorganization symptoms-attempting in each case to illuminate shared distortions of consciousness and the sense of self. We conclude by discussing the possible relevance of this approach for identifying early schizophrenic symptoms.

Physical Activity During Therapy of Self- Disorder Among Patients with Schizophrenia.A Phenomenological Understanding of the Relationship Between Healing and Physical Activity

“…Employing the concepts revealed above, it can be said that the basis of the core self, the embedded body schema, is dissolved and replaced by a psychotic attempt to maintain meaning (Fuchs, 2010;Sass & Parnas, 2003;Zahavi, 2002;Zahavi & Parnas, 2009;Henriksen, 2014). The minimal core self is thus no longer able to maintain either a stable subjectivity or an adaptive reality.…”

Consideraciones críticas sobre la propuesta de Thomas Szasz. Entre filosofía de la mente, fenomenología y psiquiatría

“…Que una discusión sobre X reproduzca ciertos valores culturales de una comunidad C no hace que X sea completamente cultural, ni que X sea falsa, dado que eso implicaría una 'falacia genética'. Si bien el término 'enfermedad mental' no cumple los criterios organicistas, tampoco se puede descartar su existencia como otro tipo de disfunción, por ejemplo como disfunción de las capacidades de la conciencia (Sass & Parnas, 2007), como una disfunción del self (Sass & Parnas, 2003) o como falta de capacidad esperadas dentro de un marco cultural específico (Gaete, 2009). Cualquiera de estos casos, toma la experiencia del paciente e intenta explicarla de maneras no organicistas, lo cual es coherente con la tesis principal de Szasz.…”

“…1 Con mayor o menor grado de plausibilidad, el concepto de enfermedad mental ha sido re entendido como un fenómeno político (Foucault, 2007), una construcción social o discursiva (Gergen, 1991), un trastorno de la estructura de la conciencia (Sass & Parnas, 2003), un trastorno de la experiencia del sí-mismo (self-experience) (Zahavi, 2008) o como un trastorno de nuestras formas de estar pre-reflexiva y afectivamente relacionado con el mundo (Ratcliffe, 2008), entre otras.…”

Genetic studies of schizophrenia: an update

“…Clinically, SCZ is characterized by symptoms traditionally classifi ed as positive (delusions and hallucinations), negative (fl attened emotions and social withdrawal), and impairments of cognitive functions [2][3][4] . The age at onset is typically in late adolescence or early adulthood [5] .…”