School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>

Kesten, Onur

doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297

Cited by 234 publications

(205 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Our last main result, Theorem 3, shows that such improvement is generally impossible. This extends the existing results in the school choice literature that the student-optimal stable rule is second-best optimal among strategy-proof rules (see, Abdulkadiroglu et al, 2009;Kesten, 2010;Kesten and Kurino, 2013). 18…”

Section: Fact 1 the Doctor-optimal Stable Rule Can Be Strategy-proofsupporting

confidence: 82%

On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts

Hirata

Kasuya

2015

SSRN Journal

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This paper studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof matching rules in manyto-one matching markets with contracts. First, the number of such rules is shown to be at most one. Second, the doctor-optimal stable rule, whenever it exists, is shown to be the unique candidate for a stable and strategy-proof rule. Third, a stable and strategyproof rule, when exists, is shown to be second-best optimal for doctor welfare, in the sense that no individually-rational and strategy-proof rule can dominate it. This last result is further generalized to non-wasteful and strategy-proof rules. Notably, all those results are established without any substitutes conditions on hospitals' choice functions, and hence, the proofs do not rely on the "rural hospital" theorem. We also show by example that the outcomes of a stable and strategy-proof rule do not always coincide with those of the cumulative offer process; hence, the above results hold not because the cumulative offer process is the only candidate for stable and strategyproof rules.

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Section: Fact 1 the Doctor-optimal Stable Rule Can Be Strategy-proofsupporting

confidence: 82%

On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts

Hirata

Kasuya

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…The coordinated scheme achieves 80 percent of this idealized benchmark. Next, we find relatively modest gains from relaxing the mechanism design constraints emphasized by a large theoretical market design literature (Erdil and Ergin 2008;Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth 2009;Kesten 2010;Kesten and Kurino 2012). Had the mechanism produced a student-optimal stable matching, the average student welfare would improve by another 0.6 percent of this range.…”

mentioning

confidence: 79%

“…This mechanism is not strategy-proof, and in general, there is no strategy-proof mechanism that Pareto dominates the deferred acceptance or stable improvement cycles mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth 2009;Kesten 2010;Kesten and Kurino 2012). Table 8 shows that the difference in distance-equivalent utility between the neighborhood and utilitarian assignment is 18.96 miles.…”

Section: B Evaluating Mechanism Design Featuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match

Abdulkadiroğlu

Agarwal²,

Pathak³

2017

American Economic Review

115

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In recent years, market design theory has inspired dramatic changes in how children are assigned to public schools across numerous American cities and around the world. The first new system adopted was for placing eighth graders into high schools in New York City (NYC). NYC's new system has not only received widespread scientific and popular acclaim (Economic Sciences Prize Committee 2012; Tullis 2014; Roth 2015), but also became a template for reforms in other cities. 1 Despite widespread adoption of and apparent consensus on the value of market-design-inspired

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“…7 Kesten (2010) recognizes the efficiency loss caused by DA and proposes a modified algorithm where students give up their priorities in certain schools to correct for the loss. Similarly, Erdil and Ergin (2008) introduce a new mechanism to improve the welfare losses created by random breaking of ties in priorities caused by DA.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Effective affirmative action in school choice

Hafalır

Yenmez

Yıldırım

2013

Theoretical Economics

214

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The prevalent affirmative action policy in school choice limits the number of admitted majority students to give minority students higher chances to attend their desired schools. There have been numerous efforts to reconcile affirmative action policies with celebrated matching mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance and top trading cycles algorithms. Nevertheless, it is theoretically shown that under these algorithms, the policy based on majority quotas may be detrimental to minorities. Using simulations, we find that this is a more common phenomenon rather than a peculiarity. To circumvent the inefficiency caused by majority quotas, we offer a different interpretation of the affirmative action policies based on minority reserves. With minority reserves, schools give higher priority to minority students up to the point that the minorities fill the reserves. We compare the welfare effects of these policies. The deferred acceptance algorithm with minority reserves Pareto dominates the one with majority quotas. Our simulations, which allow for correlations between student preferences and school priorities, indicate that minorities are, on average, better off with minority reserves while adverse effects on majorities are mitigated.

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School Choice with Consent^*

Cited by 234 publications

References 34 publications

On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts

On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts

The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match

Effective affirmative action in school choice

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School Choice with Consent*

Cited by 234 publications

References 34 publications

On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts

On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts

The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match

Effective affirmative action in school choice

Contact Info

Product

Resources

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School Choice with Consent^*