Science, Values, and the New Demarcation Problem

Abstract

In recent years, many philosophers of science have rejected the “value-free ideal” for science, arguing that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in scientific inquiry. However, this philosophical position raises the question of how to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate influences of values in science. In this paper, we argue that those seeking to address this “new” demarcation problem can benefit by drawing lessons from the “old” demarcation problem, in which philosophers tried to find a way of distinguishing between science and non-science. Many of those who worked on this problem ultimately found that efforts to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for defining science failed, and most concluded that the best solution to the problem was to characterize scientific hypotheses, theories, and research programs in terms of some common norms. We suggest that those seeking to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate value influences on science would do well to adopt a similar approach. Rather than attempting to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying appropriate value influences, it will be more fruitful to evaluate scientific activities based on their adherence to a set of epistemic and ethical norms that can be implemented in scientific practice by means of rules, conventions, policies, and procedures.

Tecnociencia feminista. Una propuesta de demarcación

“…Intersubjetividad (Longino, 1990(Longino, , 2002 sensible a las injusticias epistémicas (Fricker, 2007), inclusión de la dimensión de género en clave interseccional en la investigación e innovación a través de programas de política científica como RRI (Schiebinger, 2008(Schiebinger, , 2020, responsabilidad social, normas y códigos éticos institucionales (Resnik, 2009(Resnik, , 2023 y la configuración del espacio disciplinar de la tecnoética, entre otras iniciativas, pueden ser el conjunto de estrategias que a modo de red de contención minimice los efectos de la presencia de valores indeseados en el entramado tecnocientífico. Coincido con Resnik y Elliot (2023) en que el esfuerzo por establecer condiciones necesarias y suficientes para delimitar las influencias inadecuadas está cuando menos mal enfocado.…”

On value-laden patents: a call for moral limits

“…One of the most relevant current debates on the role of morality and values in technology and science is the so-called "New Demarcation Problem" (Holman and Wilholt, 2022;Resnik and Elliott, 2023), namely, the discussion about the (legitimate or not) role played by epistemic and non-epistemic values in science and technology. Faced with the traditional conception that only the former played a role, multiple studies have revealed the relevance that non-epistemic values, such as economic, moral and even aesthetic values (Douglas, 2009), have for the choice of scientific theories and models.…”

The Ethics of Using Artificial Intelligence in Scientific Research: New Guidance Needed for a New Tool

“…Some norms, such as testability, rigor, and reproducibility, are primarily epistemic, while others, such as fair attribution of credit, protection of research subjects, and social responsibility, are primarily moral (when enshrined in law, like instance of fraud, these norms become legal but here we only focus on ethical norms). There are also some like honesty, openness, and transparency, which have both epistemic and moral dimensions [193,194].…”

“…While reducing and managing bias are widely recognized as essential to good scientific methodology and practice [80,91], they become crucial when AI is employed in research because AI can reproduce and amplify biases inherent in the data and generate results that lend support to policies that are discriminatory, unfair, harmful, or ineffective [16,204]. Moreover, by taking machines' disinterestedness in findings as a necessary and Table 1 Norms of science (based on [193,194])…”