Scientific Explanations of Mystical Experiences

Abstract

In Part I of this paper, I took up a challenge posed by Alston (1991), Wainwright (1981), Yandell (1993), and other theists who hold the rather natural view that mystical experiences provide perceptual contact with God, roughly on a par with the access sense experience affords to the natural world. These theists recognize, at the same time, that the plausibility of this view would be significantly compromised by the possibility of scientifically explaining mystical experiences – especially if a scientific explanation were incompatible with, ruled out, or made unlikely the supposition that God has anything special to do with the occurrences of these experiences.

Religious Experience

“…Following Evan Fales (1996a), we may think of such experiences as representing purported "theophanies" or "showings" of God. I will thus refer to them in what follows as theophanic experiences.…”

“…We will examine four of these challenges here. (For a more thorough discussion of the various object-, description-, and subject-related challenges, see Franks Davis [1989]; Gale [1991]; Fales [1996a]. )…”

The Retreat Argument

“…He also argues that Lewis' theory can probably explain other religious experiences as well. Fales concludes that naturalistic explanations of religious experiences are more powerful than theistic explanations (Fales ).…”

Remembering Alston's ‘evaluative particularism’

“…14.For a very careful study of the worries facing Alston and his followers regarding the epistemology of religious experience, see Fales (1996) and (1996 a ). …”