Abstract:Litigation rates in the United States have long been considered out of proportion with the remainder of the world, leading to a good deal of economic research trying to understand the causes. Much of that literature has focused on lawyer compensation rules and availability of general damage awards. Another possible reason for differences in national litigation rates is the relative generosity of government social programs. Using a sample of 24 countries over a 12-year period, we test the relationship between t… Show more
“…Browne, Chung, and Frees (2000) find a positive relation between common law systems and both motor vehicle and general insurance demand. More recently, Kerr, Ma, and Schmitt (2009) document a negative relation between government social programs and the demand for auto and general liability insurance.…”
We investigate how investor protection, government quality, and contract enforcement affect risk taking and performance of insurance companies from around the world. We find that better investor protection results in less risk taking, as do higher quality government and greater contract enforceability. However, we find only limited evidence that these factors influence firm performance. We conclude that better overall operating environments result in less risk taking by insurers without the concomitant decline in performance. These results imply that better investor protection environments benefit policyholders and outside stockholders by preventing corporate insiders from expropriating wealth from policyholders and outside stockholders.
“…Browne, Chung, and Frees (2000) find a positive relation between common law systems and both motor vehicle and general insurance demand. More recently, Kerr, Ma, and Schmitt (2009) document a negative relation between government social programs and the demand for auto and general liability insurance.…”
We investigate how investor protection, government quality, and contract enforcement affect risk taking and performance of insurance companies from around the world. We find that better investor protection results in less risk taking, as do higher quality government and greater contract enforceability. However, we find only limited evidence that these factors influence firm performance. We conclude that better overall operating environments result in less risk taking by insurers without the concomitant decline in performance. These results imply that better investor protection environments benefit policyholders and outside stockholders by preventing corporate insiders from expropriating wealth from policyholders and outside stockholders.
“… The tort system and the availability of alternative risk transfer instruments also have a significant impact on insurer losses and, hence, insurance rates (see, e.g., Born, Viscusi, and Baker, 2009; Kerr, Ma, and Schmit, 2009). …”
This article analyzes the impact of policy form regulation on the unit price of insurance and determinants of premium changes using the 1994 deregulation of the German property-liability market as a natural experiment. Our result show that policy form regulation did not increase prices above competitive levels. Factors influencing premium changes are significantly different for the two time periods, pre-and post-deregulation, indicating that regulation affects insurance pricing. Focusing on highly competitive lines after deregulation, we find a significant price decrease, and this decrease is offset by higher prices in the remaining other lines.
“…These results strengthen the evidence of a substitution effect existing among different sources of compensation for bodily injuries. This effect has been previously demonstrated in studies of bodily injury claims decisions for auto liability compensation (Kerr et al, 2009) and workers' compensation (Biddle & Roberts, 2003).…”
Section: Kerrmentioning
confidence: 52%
“…As Cummins and Tennyson (1996) and Kerr et al (2009) found with respect to the filing of BIL auto insurance claims and Biddle and Roberts (2003) found in terms of the propensity to file a workers' compensation claim, the existence of other sources of recovery for the bodily injury loss is an important factor. For example, the presence of personal health insurance or workers' compensation benefits will offset at least partially and sometimes completely the financial impact of injuries suffered in an auto accident effectively decreasing the benefit of filing an auto insurance claim relative to the costs, ceteris paribus.…”
Cummins and Tennyson identified the presence of moral hazard in bodily injury liability auto insurance claims by adding to their model a survey response variable indicating attitudes towards dishonest behavior. The attitudinal variable was a proxy for the psychic costs a claimant considers when deciding whether to file a fraudulent insurance claim. Cummins and Tennyson found a significant relationship between the acceptance of fraudulent behaviors and the frequency of bodily injury liability auto insurance claims. This paper is a conceptual replication of the Cummins and Tennyson study utilizing a different set of data that allows for a more direct measure of the decision to file a claim and a different research methodology more appropriate for the new data. The results largely support the original results found by Cummins and Tennyson except the variable used to account for the psychic costs of initiating a fraudulent claim is not significant across all versions of the variable as indicated by the original research.
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