2021
DOI: 10.1111/abac.12219
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

CEO Network Centrality and the Likelihood of Financial Reporting Fraud

Abstract: This paper investigates the association between CEO's relative position in the social network and the likelihood of being involved in corporate fraud. Tracing a large sample of US publicly listed firms, we find that CEO network centrality is inversely related to the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. We also document a significant spillover effect of financial reporting behaviour from the dominant (most central) CEO to other CEOs in the same social network, suggesting that the ethical corporate beha… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
12
0
3

Year Published

2022
2022
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
8

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 14 publications
(15 citation statements)
references
References 79 publications
0
12
0
3
Order By: Relevance
“…We include Firm size , which is the logarithm of a company's total assets because small firms are less prone to conduct fraud, while large firms are more likely to engage in serious deception of financial reporting to accomplish their financial goals (Chen et al , 2021; Chahine et al , 2021). We include Return on assets , which is measured as net income over total assets, to control for firm profitability and accounting performance (Amiram et al , 2020; Dimitras et al , 2015; Chang and Stone, 2019).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We include Firm size , which is the logarithm of a company's total assets because small firms are less prone to conduct fraud, while large firms are more likely to engage in serious deception of financial reporting to accomplish their financial goals (Chen et al , 2021; Chahine et al , 2021). We include Return on assets , which is measured as net income over total assets, to control for firm profitability and accounting performance (Amiram et al , 2020; Dimitras et al , 2015; Chang and Stone, 2019).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Empirical investigations closely associated with our study provide very limited and inconclusive findings about the implication of CEOs with high prestige on earnings quality. A few studies showed evidence that CEOs with greater connections maintain a high quality of accrual earnings [85,92], and these CEOs are associated with minimal fraudulent incidents [93]. However, some other studies demonstrate a positive association between well-connected CEOs and earnings management [88,91,94].…”
Section: Prestigious Ceos and Earnings Qualitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Institute of Internal Auditors (IAI, 2020) indica que la función de Auditoría Interna debe trabajar en cinco componentes clave en su modelo de control interno, los cuales son: i) ambiente de control, ii) evaluación de riesgos, iii) actividades de control, iv) información y comunicación, y v) actividades de monitoreo o supervisión. Estos elementos deben coordinarse para que la función de gestión de riesgos financieros y tecnológicos aseguren eficaz y efectivamente a las organizaciones (De La Torre y Quiroz, 2020; Ge et al, 2020;Chahine et al, 2021).…”
Section: Control Interno Como Mecanismo De Aseguramientounclassified