Hume's Unified Theory of Mental Representation

Abstract

On its face, Hume's account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume's treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume's discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume's discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume's thought and contemporary philosophy of mind.

Hume on mental representation and intentionality

“…Why couldn't a perception reliably indicate and thus represent (say) a permanent self, without being copied from such a thing? (Compare Schafer, , 989–90).…”

“…In a series of recent publications, David Landy (, , ) defends the view that Hume accepts CTR against Garrett's objections. Karl Schafer () offers a compromise. The following sections address this controversy, while examining the three main kinds of perceptions that Hume distinguishes: impressions of sensation, ideas, and impressions of reflection.…”

“…Karl Schafer (, 990–98) offers a hybrid interpretation of the kind just sketched. Donald Ainslie (, 64–69) offers a similar interpretation, in the context of a Dual‐Aspect interpretation of Humean perceptions.…”

“…That Hume gives this argument may seem to show that he accepts either CTR or a hybrid theory of representation, rather than a causal role theory. He seems to claim that passions do not represent, on the grounds that they are not copies (Cohon & Owen, , 50–58; Schafer, , 984). If so, he is assuming that passions represent only if they are copies.…”

“…According to some, Hume's claim that simple ideas “represent” impressions means only that they resemble impressions. Karl Schafer (, 1000n17) notes that Peter Loptson proposed this to him. Loptson's interpretation is consistent with the Object View.…”