Policy for Poverty Alleviation and Income Redistribution with Quasi‐Public Goods

Abstract

This paper proposes a theoretical framework for a poverty-alleviation program with quasi-public goods and presents four main effects. First, this policy succeeds in self-selection, which identifies low-productive persons under imperfect information and allows them to receive at least the minimum income. Second, we can observe income redistribution by this scheme without any taxes. Third, the program contributes cost-effectiveness in many cases. Finally, it makes clear that this policy is suitable, especially in areas where low-income people are concentrated. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

A Cost‐Effective Workfare System Succeeding in Attracting Applicants to Labor Markets

“…Nichols and Zeckhauser (), Dye and Antle (), and Blackorby and Donaldson () indicated that in‐kind transfers are a solution to the screening problem. Nakamura () showed that the self‐selection systems of poverty alleviation programs are realized by providing quasi‐public goods. Nakamura () proposed a new self‐selection system through cash transfers.…”

Cash Transfers for Poverty Alleviation Under Double Asymmetric Information Regarding Income and Productivity

“…The standard analysis of in‐kind transfers as self‐selection systems is performed in situations in which individual incomes are observed. Nakamura () also proposes a mechanism that reveals high‐productivity individuals by providing quasi‐public goods. It succeeds in self‐selection when the government is able to observe individuals' incomes.…”