Screening and Signaling Non-Cognitive Skills: Experimental Evidence from Uganda

“Job Search and Hiring With Two-Sided Limited Information About Workseekers’ Skills

“…3 We build on this work by showing that both firms and workseekers face limited information about workseekers' skills. Our work is most similar to papers that study information frictions by simultaneously revealing information to both firms and workseekers about skill assessment results (Abebe et al, 2020a;Bassi and Nansamba, 2020) or evaluations from workseekers' past employers (Abel et al, 2020;Pallais, 2014). These papers show that information revelation changes workseekers' outcomes and interpret this as evidence of firm-side information frictions.…”

“…These search distortions can also lead to lower employment and lower wages conditional on employment. When both sides of the market receive credible information on workseekers' skills or past performance, these workseekers' outcomes in the labor market can improve (Abebe et al, 2020a;Abel, 2019;Bassi and Nansamba, 2020;Pallais, 2014). These information problems may be particularly important in settings where hiring is less formal and education provides less information about skills (Pritchett, 2013).…”

Labor Market Dynamics and Development

“…This approach has the benefit of being able not only to isolate information but also potentially to disentangle who is missing the information. 20 Recent work has tested such issues and finds an important role for signaling worker skills to firms (Bassi and Nansamba, 2019;Abebe et al, 2019). The effects of such an intervention are larger when certificates are provided to firms in addition to workers, suggesting that joint information about match quality is important for these effects (Carranza et al, 2019).…”

“…SeeRestuccia and Rogerson (2013) for an introduction to the literature andHsieh and Klenow (2009),Gollin et al (2014), andYoung (2013) for papers that propose and evaluate misallocation of this type.2 For example, Abebe et al (2019) directly subsidize transportation costs for workers who search; Abel et al (forthcoming) provide workers with reference letters; and several researchers certify workers' skills(Carranza et al, 2019;Abebe et al, 2019;Bassi and Nansamba, 2019). See also McKenzie (2017) for a review of the literature and other related work.3 WorldBank (2013, p. 35).4 We also use this dataset to study the cyclical properties of labor markets across countries (Donovan et al, 2019).…”

Informational Barriers to Market Access: Experimental Evidence from Liberian Firms

“…Recent studies also suggest that supply-side-worker-variation in ability to convey productive qualifications to buyers-employers-severely distorts labor markets in developing countries(Hardy & Mc- Casland, 2017;Abebe et al, 2019;Bassi & Nansamba, 2019;Carranza et al, 2019).8 We know of one other paper that experimentally varies the marketing ability of firms in a poor country:Anderson et al (2018). Their focus differs from ours: they study small-scale retail entrepreneurs rather than medium-sized, multi-sector formal firms, and analyze the impact of an intensive 10-week training, rather than a short program narrowly focused on accessing a particular market.…”