Screening Stringency in the Disability Insurance Program

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy (IFAU) is a research institute under the Swedish Ministry of Employment, situated in Uppsala. IFAU's objective is to promote, support and carry out scientific evaluations. The assignment includes: the effects of labour market and educational policies, studies of the functioning of the labour market and the labour market effects of social insurance policies. IFAU shall also disseminate its results so that they become accessible to different interested parties in Sweden and abroad. Terms of use: Documents inIFAU also provides funding for research projects within its areas of interest. The deadline for applications is October 1 each year. Since the researchers at IFAU are mainly economists, researchers from other disciplines are encouraged to apply for funding.IFAU is run by a Director-General. The institute has a scientific council, consisting of a chairman, the Director-General and five other members. Among other things, the scientific council proposes a decision for the allocation of research grants. A reference group including representatives for employer organizations and trade unions, as well as the ministries and authorities concerned is also connected to the institute. Papers published in the Working Paper Series should, according to the IFAU policy, have been discussed at seminars held at IFAU and at least one other academic forum, and have been read by one external and one internal referee. They need not, however, have undergone the standard scrutiny for publication in a scientific journal. The purpose of the Working Paper Series is to provide a factual basis for public policy and the public policy discussion. AbstractWe propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the disability insurance program has been governed over time. We analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year, by using ex-post mortality. Applying the strategy to Sweden, we find large variation in the relative health of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries over time. Some of the fluctuations correspond well to formal changes to screening stringency. However, we also find large variation in health during periods when no changes to formal eligibility criteria have been pursued.

How to combine the entry of young people in the labour market with the retention of older workers?

“…In Sweden, there is just a small effect of stricter health screening on disability entrants and no effect on the employment level of older workers (Karlström et al 2008). Johansson et al (2012) find reduced entry rates between 1986 and 2008 in the context of screening stringency of the disability insurance in Sweden. The stricter health access criteria for disability pension in Austria decreased the disability entrances by ten percentage points, with 45% of the affected persons remaining employed, while 46% became unemployed and 9% received sickness benefits through health insurance (Staubli 2011).…”

Sickness and disability policies: Reform paths in OECD countries between 1990 and 2014

“…12 For a survey of this literature and the main theoretical arguments, see for instance Starke (2006) and Van Kersbergen and Vis (2014). 13 Sweden implemented several changes to its sickness benefit scheme during the 1990s; these were, however, of limited scope (see Andr en, 2003;Johansson, Laun, & Laun, 2014). between crisis dynamics and reform activity.…”

“… Sweden implemented several changes to its sickness benefit scheme during the 1990s; these were, however, of limited scope (see Andrén, ; Johansson, Laun, & Laun, ).…”

Hiring subsidies for people with a disability: do they work?

“…Due to the strong increase in the proportion of working-age individuals entering the DI system, many empirical papers have focused on the effectiveness of policies that reduce DI inflows and/or promote employment of those disabled individuals that keep some capacity to work (partially disabled). In this line, there is a growing literature that investigates the effect on DI (and employment) participation of particular characteristics of the DI system such as the eligibility criteria or the degree of screening stringency (Gruber and Kubik 1997;Autor and Duggan 2003;De Jong, Lindeboom and van der Klaauw 2011;Staubli 2011;Johansson, Laun and Laun 2014), the generosity of the system (Marie and Vall Castelló 2012), or particular policies providing financial or in-kind work incentives to DI beneficiaries (Moffit and Hoynes 1999;Autor and Duggan 2006;Adam, Bozio and Emmerson 2010;Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky and Rust 2010;Kostol and Mogstad 2014). The Netherlands, for example, introduced several policies during the 90's to try to reduce the inflow into the DI system as well as to promote employment of disabled workers.…”