Screening workers for ability and motivation

Barigozzi, Francesca; Burani, Nadia

doi:10.1093/oep/gpw005

Cited by 23 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Within the literature on managers' intrinsic motivation, it is traditional to associate the managers' task with the level of effort, e , and the principal can observe the tasks that different types of workers are asked to perform. Barigozzi and Burani () offer career paths and hours worked as additional contractible interpretations of e . Finally, although the focus of this article is on the principal's recruiting problem, as captured by an environment of adverse selection only, Myerson's () generalized Revelation Principle establishes that in mixed models of adverse selection and moral hazard it is possible for the principal to implement a contract that specifies the manager's level of effort and the manager obeys this recommendation.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Screening for Managerial Objectives

Arce¹

2017

Southern Economic Journal

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The debate between agency and stewardship theorists on the nature of managerial objectives in itself implies that a principal may be uninformed about managers' objectives. This article introduces a model of adverse selection in managerial types where classically opportunistic agents are contrasted with stewards who exhibit intrinsic preferences for the organization's success and experience betrayal (crowding out) when they are incentivized as if they were agents. The analysis characterizes stewardship inefficiencies not previously identified by stewardship theorists. This inefficiency is minimized via a menu of contracts that emphasizes the fixed component of pay for stewards. Moreover, steward‐run firms are more successful than agent‐run firms.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Screening for Managerial Objectives

Arce¹

2017

Southern Economic Journal

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“…A recent literature studies organizations where employees derive non-monetary benefits from undertaking some tasks or from providing some types of services (see Biglaiser and Albert Ma, 2007, Buurman et al, 2012, Dur and Zoutenbier, 2014, Cassar, 2016, and Barigozzi and Burani, 2016). The idea is that, in some sectors, workers may care about the output produced by their organization, or about the recipients of the services they provide, i.e.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Envy in Mission-Oriented Organizations

Barigozzi

Manna

2017

SSRN Journal

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According to the labor donation theory, workers adhering to their firms' mission are willing to donate a portion of their paid labor. In this paper, we study how workers' fairness concerns limit the firm's ability to extract labor donation from its employees. We find that, in sectors where the firm's mission is important, optimal contracts are such that high-ability employees perceive their wage as less fair than low-ability employees and they must be rewarded with an "envy rent". The opposite is true in sectors where the firm's mission does not play a relevant role. We empirically test the predictions of the model using the German Socio-Economic Panel finding support for our theoretical results.JEL Codes: D03, D82, M54.

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“…Our study is related to a rapidly expanding theoretical literature in eco- Dur and Zoutenbier (2015), Manna (2015), Cassar (2016a), and Barigozzi and Burani (2016). In many of these studies, intrinsic motivation takes the form of altruism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…8 The SOEP is an unbalanced panel which contains survey questions about employment, earnings, preferences, and personality measures among others (see Wagner et al 2007). Our key variables of interest are self-reported monetary donations to charity, altruistic preferences, and job type or sector of employment.…”

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confidence: 99%

Serving the public interest in several ways: Theory and empirics

Dur

Lent

2018

Labour Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract We develop a model where people di¤er in their altruistic preferences and can serve the public interest in two ways: by making donations to charity and by taking a public service job and exerting e¤ort on the job. Our theory predicts that people who are more altruistic are more likely to take a public service job and, for a given job, make higher donations to charity. Comparing equally altruistic workers, those with a regular job make higher donations to charity than those with a public service job by a simple substitution argument. We subsequently test these predictions using the German Socio-Economic Panel Study, which contains data on self-reported altruism, sector of employment, and donations to charity for more than 7,500 workers. We …nd support for our predictions, though some results are sensitive to the exact de…nition of a public service job or the estimation method. Terms of use: Documents in

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Screening workers for ability and motivation

Cited by 23 publications

References 22 publications

Screening for Managerial Objectives

Screening for Managerial Objectives

Envy in Mission-Oriented Organizations

Serving the public interest in several ways: Theory and empirics

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