2012
DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2012.701032
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Searching for a New Cultural Identity: China's soft power and media culture today

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Cited by 22 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Domestically, the new leader Xi Xinping has pushed an aggressive agenda of what Robert Zoellick called a ‘mix of Mao and market’, referring to the adamant refusal to enact political reform on the one hand and having bold pro-market economic measures on the other, raising the skepticism that ‘whether a policy of Mao and the market proves internally consistent.’ 16 In the ideological and cultural arena, Xi’s policy looks tougher and more conservative than his predecessors, clamping down on political dissent and criticism on the internet, forbidding discussions of universalism, constitutionalism, and so on, while proclaiming the Chinese Dream and urging the Chinese people to gain ‘confidence in the theory, the road and the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and forge valiantly and unswervingly ahead along the right road.’ 17 However, to persuade the Chinese people to have confidence in the Chinese Dream and the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party is a formidable challenge to the leadership. As argued elsewhere, 18 the legitimation crisis lurking behind the astonishing economic growth ever since the reform and opening up, has resurfaced over and again. Underlying the issue of China’s global image and soft power is the ideological and legitimation crisis that the new leadership has yet to come to terms with.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Domestically, the new leader Xi Xinping has pushed an aggressive agenda of what Robert Zoellick called a ‘mix of Mao and market’, referring to the adamant refusal to enact political reform on the one hand and having bold pro-market economic measures on the other, raising the skepticism that ‘whether a policy of Mao and the market proves internally consistent.’ 16 In the ideological and cultural arena, Xi’s policy looks tougher and more conservative than his predecessors, clamping down on political dissent and criticism on the internet, forbidding discussions of universalism, constitutionalism, and so on, while proclaiming the Chinese Dream and urging the Chinese people to gain ‘confidence in the theory, the road and the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and forge valiantly and unswervingly ahead along the right road.’ 17 However, to persuade the Chinese people to have confidence in the Chinese Dream and the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party is a formidable challenge to the leadership. As argued elsewhere, 18 the legitimation crisis lurking behind the astonishing economic growth ever since the reform and opening up, has resurfaced over and again. Underlying the issue of China’s global image and soft power is the ideological and legitimation crisis that the new leadership has yet to come to terms with.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Regardless of competing discourses or subjectification technologies (Liu, 2011), young people in China are engaged in multiple forms of identity work and social participation through which they (re)construct their connection with society (Kang, 2012). One of the major venues for their social participation is the internet.…”
Section: Subjectivity and Chinese Young Peoplementioning
confidence: 99%