Secessions and Political Extremism: Why Regional Referenda Do Not Solve the Problem

Olofsgård, Anders

doi:10.1162/1542476042782279

Cited by 16 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Another related strand of literature is that of strategic information transmission (see e.g. Olofsgård 2005). None of these papers, however, deals with the issue of policy centralization.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-Off Facing Economic Unions

Lorz

Willmann

2008

SSRN Journal

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This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic union and the degree of policy centralization. We consider a political economy setting in which elected representatives bargain over the degree of centralization within the union. In our model strategic delegation affects the identity of the representatives and hence the equilibrium policy outcome. We show that the relationship between the size of the union and centralization may be non-monotonic: Up to a certain size enlargement leads to deeper integration, whereas beyond that size further enlargement implies less centralization. We also show that freezing the level of centralization and associate memberships can mitigate the trade-off.JEL classification: D78, H77, H87.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-Off Facing Economic Unions

Lorz

Willmann

2008

SSRN Journal

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“…The importance of asymmetric information in secessionism has already been recognized by Olofsgård (2004) who shows how signaling phenomena may drive moderate minorities to appoint extreme secessionist leaders. The model presented here is closely related to Olofsgård's, but differs in two important respects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More recent analytical work includes Bolton and Roland (1997), Fearon and van Houten (2002), and Olofsgård (2003), and Gradstein (2004, among others. With the exception of Olofsgård (2004), those papers analyze models of complete information, in which the consequences of secession are perfectly known to the citizens. More distantly related to this paper is the political economy literature on the size of nations; see Spolaore (2006) and the references therein for an exhaustive account.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world

Anesi

2012

Journal of Public Economics

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The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. AbstractWith the changing economic circumstances confronting their countries, regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem, important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community. This paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession, using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries. In a situation of asymmetric information, in which the policy-maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader, signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome, whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not. We also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre-committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy-maker. Additionally, the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders.

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“…Moreover, even if the break-up decision is made by a referendum, it should be recognized that direct and indirect democracy may interact. Voting advice given by politicians is for example able to a¤ect the plebiscite (Olofsgård, 2004), while politicians can also in ‡uence outcomes through any pre-referendum promises that they make to voters conditional on the result. Finally, those in power also have the option to organize/thwart a referendum, to neglect its outcome, or to change the franchise in the run-up to the vote.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

You Can Go Your Own Way: Explaining Partisan Support for Independence

Willems

2014

SSRN Journal

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Secessions and Political Extremism: Why Regional Referenda Do Not Solve the Problem

Cited by 16 publications

References 17 publications

Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-Off Facing Economic Unions

Enlargement versus Deepening: The Trade-Off Facing Economic Unions

Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world

You Can Go Your Own Way: Explaining Partisan Support for Independence

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