Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities

Anno, Hidekazu; Sasaki, Hiroo

doi:10.1007/s00199-012-0732-0

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…But in contrast with the present paper they assume that the quantity of the good to be allotted is fixed. Adachi (2010), Amorós (2002), Anno and Sasaki (2013), Cho and Thomson (2013), Erlanson and Flores‐Szwagrzak (2015), and Morimoto et al (2013) contain the multidimensional analysis of the division problem when several commodities have to be allotted among the same group of agents, but again the quantities of the goods to be allotted are fixed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

Bergantiños

Massó

Neme

2020

J Public Economic Theory

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We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference pro…le, each agent …nds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and e¢cient rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. The two rules are in addition envy-free, but they di¤er on wether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (i) the constrained equal losses rule is the unique individually rational and e¢cient rule that satis…es justi…ed envy-freeness on losses and (ii) the constrained equal awards rule is the unique individually rational and e¢cient rule that satis…es envy-freeness on awards.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

Bergantiños

Massó

Neme

2020

J Public Economic Theory

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“…The second-best incentive compatibility in the current paper is studied in Anno (2008); Anno and Sasaki (2013) for the same model as Sasaki (2003). Moreover, investigates the concept in a multiple-type housing market, while Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth (2009), Kesten and Kurino (2013), Erdil (2014), and Fragiadakis and Troyan (2013) study it in single-type problems.…”

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confidence: 99%

On the operation of multiple matching markets

Anno

Kurino

2016

Games and Economic Behavior

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We provide a new perspective on how to operate matching markets when there are many types of markets. Our finding is that the market-wise adaptation of strategy-proof and nonwasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategyproof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the market-wise use of the well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles and the deferred acceptance. This result gives theoretical support to the independent operation of markets observed in real-life markets as well as our practice in Market Design that separately treats each market for its design.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers : C78, D47, D71.

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Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size

Lu¹

2018

Econ Theory

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Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities

Cited by 6 publications

References 20 publications

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

On the operation of multiple matching markets

Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size

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