Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity

DiPaolo, Joshua

doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1110-y

Cited by 12 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…It also might set different standards from traditional Evidentialist or Bayesian standards of perfect rationality and intellectual virtue and vice. I have argued elsewhere this, too, is correct (DiPaolo 2019).…”

Section: Not All Explanatory Challenges Are Genealogical Challengesmentioning

confidence: 87%

Conversion, Causes, and Closed-Mindedness

DiPaolo¹

2020

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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Abstract‘You just believe that because you were raised to believe it!’ is a familiar criticism. Many converts, however, believe the opposite of what they were raised to believe. Does this make them immune to these challenges? I scrutinize this ‘conversion defense’. If these challenges only concern belief genealogy, a certain kind of convert is immune to them. However, these challenges often concern closed-mindedness rather than genealogy. Seen in this light, the convert who is immune to the genealogical critique may be more susceptible to these challenges due to her conversion. Her conversion may make her more likely to engage in ‘epistemic self-licensing’ akin to the empirically documented phenomenon of ‘moral self-licensing’.

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Section: Not All Explanatory Challenges Are Genealogical Challengesmentioning

confidence: 87%

Conversion, Causes, and Closed-Mindedness

DiPaolo¹

2020

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…There are better and worse ways of being imperfect. Secondary norms [of compensation] express how we ought to compensate for imperfections” (DiPaolo, 2019, p. 2048).…”

Section: The Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Staffel (2017, 2019, forthcoming) explores what it means to approximate an ideal and explores various distance principles for correctly measuring the distance between an agent's credences and his or her ideal counterpart's credences. DiPaolo (2019) has offered arguments in favour of an epistemic theory of the Second Best, which clarifies the extent to which we should approximate the epistemic ideals. These contributions help us substantiate the Approximation Thesis and its limits.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals

Daoust

2022

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Some epistemologists think that the Bayesian ideals matter because we can approximate them. That is, our attitudes can be more or less close to the ones of our ideal Bayesian counterpart. In this paper, I raise a worry for this justification of epistemic ideals. The worry is this: In order to correctly compare agents to their ideal counterparts, we need to imagine idealized agents who have the same relevant information, knowledge, or evidence. However, there are cases in which one's ideal counterpart cannot have one's information, knowledge, or evidence. In these situations, agents cannot compare themselves to their ideal counterpart.

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“…See Berg, , for an excellent discussion of transitional and non‐transitional obligations. Transitional and non‐transitional obligations are two types of ‘norms of compensation’ or ‘secondary norms’; for a nice discussion of secondary norms in ethics and epistemology, see DiPaolo, (forthcoming). …”

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confidence: 99%

Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons

Hicks¹

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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In this paper, I argue that the fetishism objection to moral hedging fails. The objection rests on a reasons‐responsiveness account of moral worth, according to which an action has moral worth only if the agent is responsive to moral reasons. However, by adopting a plausible theory of non‐ideal moral reasons, one can endorse a reasons‐responsiveness account of moral worth while maintaining that moral hedging is sometimes an appropriate response to moral uncertainty. Thus, the theory of moral worth upon which the fetishism objection relies does not, in fact, support that objection.

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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity

Cited by 12 publications

References 29 publications

Conversion, Causes, and Closed-Mindedness

Conversion, Causes, and Closed-Mindedness

The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals

Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons

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