Second Nature and Recognition: Hegel and the Social Space

Abstract

1 Italo TestaTranslated by G. Donis AhstracI: In this articIe I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of "second nature" and "recognition". To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper ro the theory ofHegelian and post-Hegelian Ane/'kennttng. 1he solution strategy I propose is signilìcant also in terms ofbringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of "space of reasons" that sterns from the Hegelian concept of "Spirit". I thus broach the notion of "second nature" as a bridgeconcept that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Ane/'kenntlng and for a rethinking of the "space of reasons" within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the noveltics introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between lìrst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levds. I then retum lo the qucstion of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makcs lo the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalncss.Keywords: recognition, second nature, Hegel, Brandom, McDowell 1. Introduction: the background of the question The aim of this paper is to bring into focus the notions of second nature and recognition (Anerkennung) in their reciproca! connection, both historically and theoretically. Let me begin, then, by outlining some premises for the discourse I wish to develop here. 342 ITALO TESTA Recognition revisitedA generaI objective of my study consists in elaborating a renewed vision of the theory of Anerkennung by broaching a distinction between two levels of recognition.1.1.1 A problem in the theory of recognition The broaching of this distinction is justified by the need to solve a problem that emerges in the theory of recognition, which we can illustrate by clarif}ring two sides of a dilemma connected with it:• Circularity: recognition appears to presuppose itself. A version of this problem is the one originally noted by Fichte and later reproposed by Dieter Henrich, 2 for which if reRexive self-consciousness constitutes itself through the process of recognition then to recognize reRexively I must already have a pre-reRexive familiarity with myself. 3 Thus the recognitive theory of self-consciousness, to avoid falling into a vicious circle, apparently ought to renounce explanation of the self-referential structure of self-consciousness and admit the primitivity of a notion of subjective self-reference of a prereRexive type. 1he German word Reflexioll indicates in Hegel the logica! structuce of self-reference. Thc tcnn isapplied by Hegel to natural proeesses that for an external obscrvcr cxhibit a form of self-referenee; at a higher lcve! it is applied to eonsciousness, llnderstood as inunediate Reflexion ( 108), a form of self-referenee aeeompanied for itselfby self-awareness: henee as Reflex...

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