Secret Key Agreement for Massive MIMO Systems with Two-Way Training under Pilot Contamination Attack

Im, Sanghun; Choi, Jinho; Ha, Jeongseok

doi:10.1109/glocomw.2015.7414040

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…With reasonable encryption and computational costs, such communication is possible. Additionally, taking advantage of the physical uniform characteristics of channel state information (CSI) we can generate secure and unique keys for each edge device within a network [26,27,28], using the received signal strength (RSS) [29,30] or direct information [31]. We can generate and disseminate secure keys that are extensible for physical layer authentication [32,33,34].…”

Section: Existing 5g Security Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on the Security of European 5G Private Networks

Pelin Angin,

Manolya Atalay,

Fatma Ceyda Gokce

et al. 2022

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The introduction of 5G networks has created opportunities for many vertical use cases through strong support for massive Internet of Things (IoT) connections with three main promises, i.e., massive machine type communications, enhanced mobile broadband and ultra-reliable low latency communications. With the enlarged network surface and the new technologies such as software-defined networking and network functions virtualization utilized to support the promised functionality, new security requirements have arisen. This paper focuses on private 5G networks and provides an overview of the security challenges they face along with a survey of approaches proposed for solving those challenges.

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Section: Existing 5g Security Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on the Security of European 5G Private Networks

Pelin Angin,

Manolya Atalay,

Fatma Ceyda Gokce

et al. 2022

ReBICTE

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“…The idea of exploiting wireless channel characteristics for generating secret keys has received considerable attention in recent years. A variety of LSB PHY-layer key extraction schemes has been proposed, e.g,, [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. While the security of LSB key extraction relies heavily on the uncorrelation assumption of channels, the validity of this assumption has not been evaluated/verified in these works.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research work is partially supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants CNS-1837034, CNS- 13 1745254, CNS-1659965, CNS-1659962, CNS-1460897 and DGE-1623713. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical statistical inference attack against PHY-layer key extraction in real environments

Zhu

Shu

2017

MILCOM 2017 - 2017 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)

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With the fast growth of high-performance computing, the security of traditional cryptographic secret key establishment mechanisms are seriously challenged by computingintensive attacks. As an alternative, considerable efforts have been made to develop physical (PHY) layer security measures in recent years, such as link-signature-based (LSB) secret key extraction techniques. Those mechanisms have been believed secure, based on the fundamental assumption that wireless signals received at two locations are uncorrelated when they were separated by more than half a wavelength apart. However, this assumption does not hold in some circumstances under latest observations, rendering LSB key extraction mechanisms vulnerable to attacks. The formal theoretical analysis on channel correlations in both real indoor and outdoor environments are provided in this paper. Moreover, this paper studies empirical statistical inference attacks (SIA) against LSB key extraction, whereby an adversary infers the signature of a target link. Consequently, the secret key extracted from that signature has been recovered by observing the surrounding links. Prior work assumes theoretical link-correlation models for the inference, in contrast, our study does not make any assumption on link correlation. Instead, we take machine learning (ML) methods for link inference based on empirically measured link signatures. ML algorithms have been developed to launch SIAs under various realistic scenarios. Our experimental results have shown that the proposed inference algorithms are still quite effective even without making assumptions on link correlation. In addition, our inference algorithms can reduce the key search space by many orders of magnitudes compared to brute force search. We further propose a countermeasure against the statistical inference attacks, FBCH (forward-backward cooperative key extraction protocol with helpers). In the FBCH, helpers (other trusted wireless nodes) are introduced to provide more randomness in the key extraction. Our experiment results verify the effectiveness of the proposed protocol.

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“…Throughout the literature, to the best of the authors' knowledge, the optimized transmission for a SWIPT system with pilot spoofing attack has not been considered. However, there has been research that explores new signal processing methods to enhance the information-secrecy in the presence of a pilot spoofing attack [1], [3]- [9]. The recently developed signal processing algorithms consider recovering network security either by: 1) improving the processing of the signal (which might include the information and/or artificial noise (AN)) transmission [1], [3]- [7]; 2) or by improving both the processing of the signal and the training sequence transmission [8], [9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

SWIPT Massive MIMO Systems With Active Eavesdropping

Alageli

Ikhlef

Chambers

2019

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

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We consider the optimization of the downlink transmission for simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) in multi-cell massive multiple-input multipleoutput (MIMO) systems. The system comprises a two-antenna active energy harvester (EH) which is capable of legitimately harvesting energy via one antenna, and illegitimately and actively eavesdropping the signal intended for certain information user(s) (IU(s)) via the other antenna for the purpose of information decoding or energy harvesting. Thereby, the considered problems are: 1) when the EH eavesdrops for the purpose of information decoding, i.e., the EH is information-untrusted by the base station (BS), we propose to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate under a constraint on a worst-case average harvested energy (AHE); 2) when the EH eavesdrops one or multiple IUs for energy harvesting, i.e., the EH is information-trusted by the BS, we propose to maximize the sum-rate of the IUs under a constraint on a worst-case AHE by the EH. We derive asymptotic expressions for a lower bound on ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) and AHE in large system limit. Then, we use these results to optimize the power allocation for downlink SWIPT transmissions which include: information signals, artificial noise (AN) and energy signal towards the IUs, legitimate and illegitimate antennas of the EH, respectively. Simulation results show the accuracy of our asymptotic analysis. We show that there is a performance tradeoff between the worst-case ESR and the worst-case AHE. In addition, the impact of the combined legitimate/illegitimate operation of the EH on the SWIPT performance is evaluated.

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Secret Key Agreement for Massive MIMO Systems with Two-Way Training under Pilot Contamination Attack

Cited by 9 publications

References 19 publications

A Survey on the Security of European 5G Private Networks

A Survey on the Security of European 5G Private Networks

Empirical statistical inference attack against PHY-layer key extraction in real environments

SWIPT Massive MIMO Systems With Active Eavesdropping

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