SECTAR: Secure NoC using Trojan Aware Routing

Manju, R.; Das, Abhijit; Jose, John; Mishra, Prabhat

doi:10.1109/nocs50636.2020.9241711

Cited by 32 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…HTs can also modify routing logic. Due to wrong route computation, a packet may travel in the wrong direction and exhibit a ping-pong effect [3]. Such HTs can significantly increase packet latency.…”

Section: Electronic Noc Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since any module in the NoC mesh is oblivious of the location of the HT infected node, to mitigate HT at run-time, each router needs to have a mechanism to detect the presence of HTs, to help localize the node where an HT resides, and mitigate the impact of HT behavior. HT detection and localization using caging is a promising approach [3], [4]. The HT detection can be based on hashing of message digests and lightweight encryption mechanisms.…”

Section: Fig 3: Illustration Of Packet Rerouting In 8x8 Mesh Nocmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Electronic, Wireless, and Photonic Network-on-Chip Security: Challenges and Countermeasures

2022

Self Cite

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Networks-on-chips (NoCs) are an integral part of emerging manycore computing chips. They play a key role in facilitating communication among processing cores and between cores and memory. To meet the aggressive performance and energy-efficiency targets of machine learning and big data applications, NoCs have been evolving to leverage emerging paradigms such as silicon photonics and wireless communication. Increasingly, these NoC fabrics are becoming susceptible to security vulnerabilities, such as from hardware trojans that can snoop, corrupt, or disrupt information transfers on NoCs. This article surveys the landscape of security challenges and countermeasures across electronic, wireless, and photonic NoCs.

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Section: Electronic Noc Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Fig 3: Illustration Of Packet Rerouting In 8x8 Mesh Nocmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electronic, Wireless, and Photonic Network-on-Chip Security: Challenges and Countermeasures

2022

Self Cite

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“…For example, a Prime+Probe like side-channel attack is also proposed in NoC, where its infrastructure is used to monitor the contents of the shared LLC [11]. There are a wide variety of Trojan based attacks launched on NoC based SoCs like, eavesdropping [12][13], data integrity [14], information leakage [15][16], [17] [18], delay-of-service [19][20], performance degradation [21] [22], etc. Except [16], all other works actively use NoC resources to launch their attacks on the SoC.…”

Section: Related Work and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

LOKI: A Hardware Trojan Affecting Multiple Components of an SoC

Rajan

Das

Jose

2022

2022 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)

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Outsourcing Intellectual Properties (IPs) from vendors around the globe exposes System-on-Chip (SoC) designs to malicious implants like Hardware Trojans (HTs). Carefully crafted HTs with extremely rare trigger conditions evade conventional validation. While Machine Learning (ML) based validation increases detection accuracy, they themselves are vulnerable to Trojan attacks. Available detection and mitigation techniques fall short when an HT is capable of affecting multiple components of an SoC. This paper proposes an intermittent and robust HT that can attack the Network-on-Chip (NoC), the shared cache, and the cores, all at once. The proposed HT is mounted in the Network Interface (NI) of a malicious IP and can be triggered by specific inputs. Experimental evaluation shows that the proposed HT can increase packet latency by 3.44x (affecting the NoC), increase miss penalty by 15% (affecting the cache) and decrease system speedup by 10% (affecting the cores). Moreover, this paper also discusses why state-of-the-art defence mechanisms are insufficient to tackle the proposed HT and suggests better solutions.

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“…Trojan-aware routing was also adopted in [83] to address DoS attacks started by malicious routers. The assumed HT takes control of the router to misroute any packet heading to destinations located at the same column as the malicious router.…”

Section: Preserving Availabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are critical problems with this HT detection scheme. First, latency is influenced by the network's workload, leading to false positives [83]. Second, using static thresholds may also lead to more false positives and false negatives in HT detection.…”

Section: Preserving Availabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey on the Security of Wired, Wireless, and 3D Network-on-Chips

et al. 2021

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Network-on-Chips (NoCs) have been widely used as a scalable communication solution in the design of multiprocessor system-on-chips (MPSoCs). NoCs manage communications between on-chip Intellectual Property (IP) cores and allow processing cores to achieve higher performance by outsourcing their communication tasks. NoC paradigm is based on the idea of resource sharing where hardware resources, including buffers, communication links, routers, etc., are shared between all IPs of the MPSoC. In fact, the data being routed by each NoC router might not be related to the router's local core. Such a utilization-centric design approach can raise security issues in MPSoCs-based designs, e.g., integrity and confidentiality of the data being routed in an NoC might be compromised by unauthorized accesses/modifications of intermediate routers. Many papers in the literature have discovered and addressed security holes of NoCs, aiming at improving the security of the NoC paradigm. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no solid survey study on the security vulnerabilities and countermeasures for NoCs. This paper will review security threats and countermeasures proposed so far for wired NoCs, wireless NoCs, and 3D NoCs. The paper aims at giving the readers an insight into the attacks and weaknesses/strengths of countermeasures.

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SECTAR: Secure NoC using Trojan Aware Routing

Cited by 32 publications

References 14 publications

Electronic, Wireless, and Photonic Network-on-Chip Security: Challenges and Countermeasures

Electronic, Wireless, and Photonic Network-on-Chip Security: Challenges and Countermeasures

LOKI: A Hardware Trojan Affecting Multiple Components of an SoC

A Survey on the Security of Wired, Wireless, and 3D Network-on-Chips

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