Sectarianism and conflict in Syria

Abstract

This article challenges the sectarian narrative of Syria's current civil war, which relies on several false assumptions about the nature of political identity. It first questions how sectarian the uprising and civil war actually are, suggesting that the conflict is 'semi-sectarian', given the multiple other fault lines of contention, notably class, ideology and other non-sect, sub-state ties. It then draws on the theoretical debates between primordialists, ethno-symbolists and modernists to historicise political identity development in Syria. In doing so, it reasserts the modernist case, emphasising how political identities in Syria, both national and sectarian, have developed in a complex interrelated manner in the modern era and how the recent violent mobilisation of sectarian identity is the result of long-and short-term structural, economic, socio-cultural and political factors rather than unchanging ancient animosities. Of these, the most vital remain structural changes and elite reactions to them, with the prospect of state collapse in Syria's future the most likely cause of a descent into further sectarian chaos.

Lineages of the Islamic State: An International Historical Sociology of State (De‐)Formation in Iraq

“…Lewis, ). However, both of these assumptions have been effectively challenged (Haddad, ; Jung, ; Matin, ; Matin, ; Matin, ; Phillips, ; Ruthven, ). Analytically, most existing accounts variously concentrate on IS's immediate origins in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war (Al‐Tamimi, ; Hashim, ), its salafi (fundamentalist) doctrine (Al‐Ibrahim, ), religious zeal (Wood, ), organisational structure (Acun, ; Hashim, ), military tactics (Katagiri, ), revenue sources (Kan, : 15; Tripp, ), hyper‐recruitment of foreign fighters (Al‐Ubaydi, ; Basit, ), or necessary measures for defeating the movement (Cordesman, ; McCants, ), or a combination of two or more of these aspects (Fromson and Simon, ).…”

Beyond the beyond(s): On the (many) third way(s) beyond primordialism and instrumentalism in the study of sectarianism

“…A similar picture appears in May Darwich and Tamirace Fakhoury's (2016: 715) study of the “securitization of sectarianism in the international relations of the Syria crisis.” Again, the existing literature is presented as divided between “primordial” and “instrumental” approaches, both of which have “proven limited in accounting for the mechanisms through which identities emerge as security issues in some cases and not others.” The framing is repeated by Vali Nasr (: 80), who explains that the “two principal theoretical approaches in the social sciences to explain ethnic mobilization have been primordialism and instrumentalism.” The chapter appears in the introduction to the edited volume Sectarianization : Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East , where Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (2017: 6‐7) in the introduction present three “ethno‐religious” schools of thought, with constructivism as “a middle ground between primordialism and instrumentalism.” The exact same labels may not always be used, but the basic framing remains the same. In his analysis of “Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” Christopher Phillips () discusses the shortcomings of both “primordialist” and “modernist” approaches, which turns out to be quite similar to instrumentalism. On the same empirical topic, Raphaël Lefèvre argues that “there are two broad schools of thought striving to explain the current prevalence of sectarian violence in Syria emphasizing either ‘ancient hatreds’ or ‘divide and rule”’ (Matthiesen et al, : 10).…”

“…Thus, to primordialists, the underlying key drivers of sectarianism are supposed to be doctrinal differences between Shia and Sunni Islam. A concept very often referred to in presentations of the primordialist position (e.g., Colgan, ; Hashemi & Postel, ; Jacoby, ; Jacoby & Neggaz, ; Matthiesen et al, ; Phillips, ; Salloukh, ; Wehrey, ) is “ancient hatred”, which according to primordialists, we are told, is so deeply embedded in the collective beliefs of the members of these societies that it overshadows other possible sources of identity or conflict.…”

“…When claims about how the “sectarian journey” has been dominated by primordialists are substantiated, it is far more rare to find references to the academic debate about the (re)emergence of sectarianism in the Middle East. Usually, they are limited to two figures (e.g., Darwich & Fakhoury, ; Malmvig, ; Osman, ; Phillips, ). The first is Geneive Abdo (: 2; 2017), according to whom an understanding of the New Sectarianism requires “serious consideration be given to religious difference in its own right, and not simply as an epiphenomenon stemming from social, economic, or political contestation.” The second is Nasr (: 20), who in his discussion about the Shia Revival portrays the Shia‐Sunni conflict as “a struggle for the soul of Islam—a great war of competing theologies and conceptions of sacred history.” However, neither of these works is highly theoretical or specifically directed to a narrow academic audience.…”

Editorial

“…However, politically, the allegiances between them are more fluid depending on the context, especially as the Turkish ruling party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) is pursuing a national and international Sunni Islam-based politics which works against both the Alawites and Alevis, who are united in their opposition to Sunni Islam. The Syrian conflict has led to an intensification of sectarianism not only between religious and ethnic groups but also within the state politics of the surrounding countries (Altuğ, 2013;Phillips, 2015). Whereas much research on ethnic groups can apply clear-cut concepts of either ethnicity or religion to describe them, Alevis cannot be simply confined within one of these categories alone.…”