Secure Anonymous Broadcasting in Vehicular Networks

Abstract

Vehicular networks face a typical quandary in their requirement for communications that are at once secure and private. While the messages broadcast between vehicles and between vehicles and the supporting infrastructure must be authentic and non repudiable, they must also ensure the vehicle driver's anonymity. The Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) framework's Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) application development architecture mandates the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) mechanisms for securing messages, consequently compromising the driver's expectation of privacy. In this paper, we propose a WAVE-based protocol for the secure and anonymous propagation of vehicle safety broadcast messages. A hybrid key infrastructure approach is put forth which combines the use of a shared network authorization key for devices that require anonymity and PKI for devices that do not.

Insider attack attribution using signal strength‐based hyperbolic location estimation

“…However in multiplicative probabilities, if two receiver pairs agree with confidence 0.95 that a transmitter is located in a particular area, then that area is assigned confidence 0.95 2 . If four receiver pairs agree, then the confidence drops to 0.95 4 . We require a scheme to assign a probability distribution to the possible transmitter location where agreement from multiple receivers compounds the probability inside the intersecting hyperbolic areas without redistributing it outside the intersections.…”

“…However, in vehicular applications where messages may be signed but not encrypted, digital signatures have been deemed a critical threat to privacy for facilitating location tracking [3]. The current trend in securing this type of message in vehicular networks circumvents the use of individualized digital certificates for each node [4][5][6]. In a revocation scheme based solely on the originator's logical identity or other falsifiable credential, the network cannot attribute the source of an attack message directly to the rogue, nor can it prevent the attacker from using a new identity in subsequent attacks.…”

Secure Safety Messages Broadcasting in Vehicular Network

“…Dynamic nature of group managers due to consecutive position change of members and lack of supervision for members are challenges exist in this method. In [4], a hybrid key infrastructure is used to maintain the security aspects. Authentication is satisfied by a shared symmetric key in every region, so anonymity and privacy are also gained simultaneously.…”

“…In this paper, we propose an applicable approach based on SAB 1 protocol [4] that is one of the static methods. In the proposed schema, we count three challenges of this method and resolve them.…”

“…In our proposed schema, for sending safety message, vehicles generate message signature with HMAC function and encrypt ID with P-224 curve [4]. As we know, hash operation is much faster than encryption and its delay is not considerable in comparison with encryption delay.…”