2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.iot.2020.100249
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Secure key agreement for multi-device home IoT environment

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Cited by 5 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 23 publications
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“…O LiKe é caracterizado por materiais de criptografia efêmeros, suporte para conectividade intermitente com um terceiro confiável (Trusted Third Party -TTP), operac ¸ões leves de re-chaveamento e robustez contra ataques de personificac ¸ão. Garg et al [11] propõe um protocolo de seguranc ¸a com acordo de chaves em IoT para casas inteligentes (smart home) chamado Multi-device Key Agreement (MKA). O protocolo é baseado nas propriedades de func ¸ões hash e criptografia de curva elíptica.…”
Section: Trabalhos Relacionadosunclassified
“…O LiKe é caracterizado por materiais de criptografia efêmeros, suporte para conectividade intermitente com um terceiro confiável (Trusted Third Party -TTP), operac ¸ões leves de re-chaveamento e robustez contra ataques de personificac ¸ão. Garg et al [11] propõe um protocolo de seguranc ¸a com acordo de chaves em IoT para casas inteligentes (smart home) chamado Multi-device Key Agreement (MKA). O protocolo é baseado nas propriedades de func ¸ões hash e criptografia de curva elíptica.…”
Section: Trabalhos Relacionadosunclassified
“…Li et al [15] proposed a low-cost mutual authentication method and anonymous key agreement. However, Garg and Lee [16] showed that Li et al' method is vulnerable to some attacks, such as node capture and personification. Hence, Garg and Lee proposed a method to mitigate the vulnerable found in [15].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At this juncture, real world consequences may arise when the attacker is potential in generating illegitimate control command to the indoor smart home devices, and further this false control command generated by the attackers has the possibility of being received by the end devices. For instance, the attacker in a smart home environment has the feasibility of gaining physical access to the home in order to carry out criminal activities such as larceny or assault, when an attacker successfully compromises the smart door look for accepting the attacker generated fake open door command 13 . In this context, a diversified number of authentication protocols were contributed in the literature for concentrating on the generation of secure session keys that could be utilized for the generation of well authenticated channels.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, the attacker in a smart home environment has the feasibility of gaining physical access to the home in order to carry out criminal activities such as larceny or assault, when an attacker successfully compromises the smart door look for accepting the attacker generated fake open door command. 13 In this context, a diversified number of authentication protocols were contributed in the literature for concentrating on the generation of secure session keys that could be utilized for the generation of well authenticated channels. Majority of the IoT integrated in the smart home environment does not possess adequate storage, memory, and computation power for supporting the implementation of the existing authentication protocols as they computationally depend on intensive cryptographic algorithms.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%