Secure Two-Party Computation Based on Fast Cut-and-Choose Bilateral Oblivious Transfer

Abstract

In secure two-party computation, each party has its input and wants to jointly compute a function from which it obtains the output corresponding to its respective inputs. For achieving security against a malicious adversary, an effective approach is using cut-and-choose, which requires the circuit constructor P1 to construct S copies of the circuit C (C is used to compute the function F). The circuit evaluator P2 selects S∕2 circuits to open for the check. If these S∕2 circuits are correctly constructed, P2 assumes that the remaining S∕2 circuits are also correctly constructed and uses the remaining circuits to compute. However, this method introduces significant computational complexity and interactive rounds, mainly due to more circuits that must be used for security purposes and the need for multiple interactions to transmit the keys. In this paper, regarding the issue above, we present a novel secure two-party computation protocol, and it can achieve security against the malicious adversary. Concretely, we still use the idea of cut-and-choose but improve the cut-and-choose oblivious transfer (CCOT) of the usual secure two-party computation protocol into cut-and-choose bilateral oblivious transfer (CCBOT) and propose a variant of it that we call batch single-choice CCBOT, which makes our protocol only needs two rounds of interaction to complete the transmission of all keys and 28Sl of exponentiations. In addition, we use a check mechanism to prevent the case that p1 cheats, but P2 is powerless. Our proposed protocol with an error probability of 2–s of P1 significantly optimizes the communication rounds and computation overheads, solves the selective failure attack, and ensures the consistency of the input.

Post‐quantum secure two‐party computing protocols against malicious adversaries

“…The following comparison with classical studies based on Cut-and-Choose techniques 12,18,20 is done for communication cost, symmetric and asymmetric computational cost, and quantum resistance. The detailed differences between the three protocols are shown in Table 5.…”

“…The protocol security of literature 12,18,20 relies on the DDH assumption, which is not theoretically resistant to quantum attacks, and the communication cost is determined by all the garbled circuit ciphertexts and cluster elements. With 220 bits per group element and 128 bits per ciphertext size, the communication bandwidth of literature 12 is roughly 449,640,000 bits (about 53.60 MB of data), while the communication bandwidth of literature 18 is estimated to be about 177,725,440 bits (about 21.19 MB of data) using the same parameters.…”

“…In 2015, Zhao et al 19 identified the complexity of the interaction between both parties during the protocol's key transmission phase, designed based on CCOT, proposing a bidirectional CCOT based on homomorphic encryption to circumvent this. In 2022, Wang et al 20 built on literature 21 on DDH‐based bidirectional CCOT to built a protocol that only requires two rounds of contact to complete key transfer, significantly increasing the protocol efficiency.…”

“…Protocol main communication bandwidth (KB). Comparison with the security performance of the protocols in the literature 12,18,20.…”

Retracted: Secure Two-Party Computation Based on Fast Cut-and-Choose Bilateral Oblivious Transfer

“…Tis article has been retracted by Hindawi, as publisher, following an investigation undertaken by the publisher [1]. Tis investigation has uncovered evidence of systematic manipulation of the publication and peer-review process.…”